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Applying Circular Reasoning to Linear
Transactions: Substance Over Form
Theory in U.S. and U.K. Tax Law
By KAREN B. BROWN*
I. INTRODUCTION
"The step-transaction doctrine is a particular manifestation of the
more general tax law principle that purely formal distinctions cannot ob-
scure the substance of a transaction."' The step transaction doctrine re-
fers to situations in which a court employs a substance over form
approach to ignore or disregard ostensibly separate steps taken by a tax-
payer.2 For the purpose of determining tax consequences, U.S. courts
employ the step transaction doctrine to treat several related transactions
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School A.B. Princeton University; J.D.,
LL.M. New York University School of Law. This Article is dedicated with love to the mem-
ory of my aunt, Ella McAlister Johnson, an extraordinary woman of great strength, courage,
and dignity. She taught me never to give any effort (a sewing project, a term paper, or a
friendship) less than my best. I would like to thank the Brooklyn Law School summer stipend
fund for its generous support of this project. Special thanks go to Professors Lawrence Lok-
ken, Norman Poser, Leo Raskind, Deborah Schenk, and David Williams for comments on
previous drafts of this article. Finally, I would like to thank my research assistants, Susan
Barbour and Timothy Rodgers.
1. McDonald's Restaurants of Ill. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 1982),
rev'g, McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972 (1981). But see, e.g., Joshua D.
Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REv. 365, 388 (1988) ("Be-
cause the step transaction doctrine determines only what actions are to be looked at together to
determine the 'substance' of the transaction, its application is necessarily (but, again, not al-
ways explicitly) followed by application of the substance versus form doctrine, in that courts
must determine the appropriate tax characterization of the redefined exchanges."). Another
scholar treats the step transaction and the substance over form doctrines as separate. John
Tiley, Judicial Anti-Avoidance Doctrines The US Alternatives- Part II, 1987 BRIT. TAX REv.
220, 236 [hereinafter Tiley, U.S Alternatives, Part i1].
2. This Article does not tackle the question of whether "substance over form" or "step
transaction" approaches connote discrete theories. In one recent case, for instance, the court
noted that the step transaction doctrine determines which transactions will be treated as one in
applying a substance over form analysis. Associated wholesale Grocers Inc. v. United States,
927 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1991), afg, 720 F. Supp. 887 (D. Kan. 1989). The terms "step
transaction" and "substance over form," are used to describe approaches taken by the British
judiciary even though the British judiciary does not employ the terminology. See discussion
infra note 13 and accompanying text.
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as a single transaction. In applying the theory, a court may ignore the
form chosen by the parties to a transaction and adopt a realistic ap-
proach to determine appropriate tax treatment.3 The realistic approach
is based upon the premise that the substance, and not the form, of a
transaction should govern tax consequences.4 The decision to ignore
form is made difficult by the very nature of tax statutes in which the form
chosen is often determinative of tax consequences.5
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the substance over form approach
in Gregory v. Helvering,6 which involved a corporate spin-off aimed at
disguising a taxpayer's attempt to receive a dividend at a reduced tax
cost.7 The Gregory Court later adopted step transaction theory in a re-
structured sale. A restructured sale occurs when an intended sale by a
taxpayer to another is restructured by the taxpayer as a sale by a third
party, who is often related to the taxpayer. The restructured sale allows
the parties to take advantage of preferential tax provisions.8 However,
3. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 476 (1939).
4. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1503, 1519-20 (1991)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In tax law, we should remember, substance rather than form de-
termines tax consequences."); Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 737 (1989)("[T]he [tax]
statute plainly refers to one integrated transaction and, again, makes clear that we are to look
to the character of the exchange as a whole and not simply to its component parts."); BORIS I.
BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 1
4.3.3, 4.3.5 (2d ed. 1989). To reach this conclusion a court must choose to ignore formal
techniques chosen by the taxpayer.
5. See, eg., John Tiley, JudicialAnti-Avoidance Doctrines: Corporations and Conclusions,
1988 BRIT. TAX REV. 108, 139 [hereinafter Tiley, Corporations & Conclusions] ("Law, even
tax law, is a set of rules which can contain more or less flexibility; the notion that form Is
important is fundamental to the application of these rules."); Marvin A. Chirelstein, Learned
Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 440 (1968) ("In selccting
the form in which a proposed business transaction shall be cast, therefore, it is said to be vital
for the tax planner to consider and evaluate 'all of the possible routes to his client's destina.
tion,' and the ability to generate a multiplicity of formal alternatives, however sterile the exer-
cise in any other context, is usually thought to be the true mark of a creative tax adviser.",
(citations and footnotes omitted)). An example of the importance of form is the decision in tax
law to treat a corporation as an entity separate from a shareholder who owns 100% of tile
stock. See, eg., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Commissioner
v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340, 349 (1988).
6. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), affig 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), rev'g 27
B.T.A. 223 (1932).
7. A corporate spin-off involves a transfer of property to a subsidiary followed by a dis-
tribution to shareholders of the stock of the subsidiary. BORIS I. BIrTKER & JAMES S. EUS-
TICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 13.01, at 13-3
(5th ed. 1987) [hereinafter BITTKER & EUSTICE II].
8. See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), rev'g 143 F.2d 823 (5th
Cir. 1944), rev'g 2 T.C. 531 (1943); cf. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S.
451 (1950), afflg 83 F. Supp. 843 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
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the Gregory principle is "of little value in the solution of tax problems"9
because it fails to provide an analytical framework sufficient to guide a
court in distinct factual situations.10
The British House of Lords seemed to reject the concept of sub-
stance over form in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Duke of Westmin-
ster." However, in 1982, the British courts adopted a revolutionary
approach 2 derived from the Gregory principle for the analysis of tax
avoidance schemes.'" Applying this revolutionary approach in Ramsay,
the House of Lords used a substance over form doctrine 14 to ignore a
circular 5 or self-canceling"6 multi-step transaction in which the taxpayer
began and ended in the same financial position and claimed a tax loss. In
Furniss v. Dawson17, the British courts extended application of the Ram-
say principle to a restructured sale transaction, ignoring a purported sale
by an intermediary and finding a sale by the taxpayer."'
The Gregory and Ramsay principles were responses to pure tax
9. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473,476 (1939); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734,
741 n.7 (2d Cir. 1966).
10. Judge Wisdom noted:
But the solution of hard tax cases requires something more than easy generalization
that the substance rather than the form of a transaction is determinative of its tax
effect. Gregory should not be considered a 'talisman of magical powers,' since in
numerous situations the form by which a transaction is effected does influence or
control its tax consequences.... This generalization does, however, reflect the truth
that courts will look beyond the superficial formalities of a transaction to determine
the proper tax treatment.
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 939 (1971)(citations omitted).
11. Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Duke of Westminster,[1935] All F-R. 383 (H.L). This
Article employs the terms "substance over form" and "step transaction doctrine" to refer to
the new approach taken by the British courts although they do not employ such terminology.
See, eag., John Tiley, Judicial Anti-Avoidance Doctriner The US Alternatives, 1987 BRIT. TAX
REv. 180, 181 [hereinafter Tiley, U.S. Alternatives].
12. Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Burmah Oil Co. Ltd., [1982] B.T.C. 56 (H.L.).
13. W.T. Rausay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1981] 1 All E.R. 865 (H.L). While
the Gregory case was not cited, the Court offered as examples at least two U.S. cases founded
upon principles derived from Gregory: Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) and
Gilbert v. Commissioner 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957). See Ramsay, [1981] 1 All E.R. at 873.
14. See discussion supra note 11.
15. On the ground that each taxpayer was brought back to his or her starting financial
position, the transactions were considered "circular" or "self-canceling." Ramsay, [1981] 1
All E.R. at 874.
16. Id.
17. Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E-R. 530 (H.L.).
18. Id at 544. The approach taken by the House of Lords was modified in Craven v.
White, [1988] 3 All E.R. 495 (H.L.), discussed infra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
Gregory was applied in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), discussed
infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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avoidance schemes, where the taxpayer had no other purpose.1 9 These
principles are appropriate concepts for analyzing pure tax avoidance
schemes which are denoted as circular arrangements. 20 However, a de-
bate currently rages regarding whether those principles should be used to
analyze a transaction involving a tax avoidance motive, a business pur-
pose, and legitimate steps to achieve those ends.21 This second type of
transaction is referred to as a linear scheme.22
Recent cases decided by U.S. and U.K. courts demonstrate the con-
tinuing importance of the step transaction doctrine. These cases reflect
an inability to apply the doctrine to linear schemes in a manner that
acknowledges the competing interests of the taxpayer and the tax author-
ity. The courts have not been able to distinguish between legitimate tax
planning, the "safe channel of acceptable tax avoidance,"23 and the
"dangerous shallows of unacceptable tax evasion."'24 The U.S. and U.K.
courts generally view principles developed for simpler transactions as in-
appropriate for sophisticated modem business techniques and goals. The
recent decisions in the U.S. case of Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner and
the U.K. case of Craven v. White reflect the belief that principles
designed to prevent taxpayers from circumventing tax statutes by the use
of circular transactions accomplishing no business end are not applicable
to linear transactions intended to accomplish both business and tax-
avoiding ends.
The courts err, however, in completely rejecting the reasoning found
in cases involving circular transactions in their analysis of linear transac-
19. The Gregory case, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), may be both linear and circular, under the
definitions in the text accompanying notes 14-22. In that case, the taxpayer achieved a finan-
cial result (she obtained shares held by her wholly owned corporation) but she did so in a
transaction that lacked any business purpose. Because the attempted reorganization in Greg.
ory was motivated solely by a tax avoidance aim, this Article has classified the case as a circu-
lar one.
20. For the purposes of this Article, the term circular transaction denotes an arrangement
in which the taxpayer achieves no financial or economic result, i.e., it begins and ends in the
same financial position, but obtains a tax advantage. Peter Millett, Artificial Tax Avoidance:
The English and American Approach, 1986 BArr. TAX REv. 327, 335-36 [hereinafter Millett,
Artifical Avoidance].
21. Tiley, U.S. Alternatives, supra note 11, at 185.
22. The term linear transaction signifies an arrangement in which the taxpayer achieves
an economic or financial result after inserting one or more tax minimizing steps. The term
"linear" transaction was used by the court in Craven v. White, discussed infra notes 133-45. In
other words, the taxpayer takes steps to achieve a business objective in a manner that will
minimize tax liability.
23. Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E.R. 530, 532 (H.L.).
24. Id.




tions. The courts readily adopt a substance over form approach in judg-
ing circular transactions because these lack a legitimate goal or business
purpose. A similar approach should be taken in evaluating linear trans-
actions because the mere existence of a business purpose should not pre-
clude scrutiny of a transaction designed to minimize taxes. While the
absence of a business purpose in circular arrangements presents an easy
case for a substance over form analysis, the presence of such a purpose
should not shield the linear arrangement from scrutiny.
This Article compares the application of the step transaction doc-
trine to linear transactions by U.S. and U.K. courts and proposes an
overhaul of the underlying theory. 26 Present applications of the doctrine
demonstrate the critical need for a different analysis because the courts
generally have wrongly focused on the themes of taxpayer intent and
business purpose and have neglected consideration of statutory intent2 7
This Article's critique of the approaches taken by U.S. and U.K. courts
indicates that revision of the step transaction doctrine is necessary to pro-
vide accurate evaluation of tax transactions.
This Article proposes that a court should apply the step transaction
doctrine where a taxpayer's arrangement achieves a result inconsistent
with the legislative intention underlying a statute and where the result
attained was within the taxpayer's control .2  When a court is unable to
discern legislative intention, it should assume the role of statutory inter-
preter and resolve ambiguity or silence by balancing the interests of the
26. The proposal is aimed primarily at U.S. tax jurisprudence. While adoption on both
sides of the Atlantic is urged, this writer does not undertake to direct British tax jurisprudence.
See Tiley, US Alternatives; Part II, supra note 1, at 240 (noting that adoption by the British
judiciary of a U.S.-type approach would entail a "major change in attitude.").
27. Four models have dominated the U.S. tax arena. The first model presented in Mc-
Donald's Restaurants of III. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982), involved the inser-
tion of a reorganization step prior to stock sales by the taxpayers. The second model,
described in TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1980), involved
the payment of a dividend before a sale of stock by the corporate taxpayer. The third model,
the subject of Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966), combined a divi-
sive reorganization with an amalgamating one in order to dispose of unwanted assets at no tax
cost. The fourth involved distribution of property as a dividend in order to permit a sale by a
shareholder instead of by the corporation to avoid two levels of taxation. The fourth model
has been of less significance since the enactment of tax reform in 1986. See Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
The British cases involve two models. First, the Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E.R. 530
(H.L.), and Craven v. White, [1988] 3 All E.R. 495 (H.L.), cases involved intermediate trans-
fers of property before ultimate disposition in order to achieve a tax-free sale. Second, Shep-
herd v. Lyntress Ltd., [1989], B.T.C. 346 (Chan.) involved an intermediate disposition of
property to affiliated corporations before ultimate disposal in order to permit the offset of
recognized gain by certain loss deductions of the affiliates.
28. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
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taxpayer against the interests of the taxing authority.29 A balancing of
interests preserves the taxpayer's ability to predict the tax consequences
of business transactions that literally comply with the requirements of a
preferential tax statute.30 A balancing approach also addresses the corre-
sponding need to accommodate the taxing authority's interest in prevent-
ing unacceptable avoidance of taxes by mere formal compliance with the
statute.31 The approach would involve the examination of factors that
pertain to the propriety of recharacterizing a business transaction. These
include whether the arrangement achieves a deferral of or an escape from
taxation, whether each step of the transaction is motivated by a business
exigency, the taxpayer's control over steps taken, the specificity of the
statute, and, in rare situations, the taxpayer's intention to avoid taxation.
This Article critiques the recent convergence in approach to the step
transaction doctrine by the U.S. and U.K. courts and the failure of those
courts to achieve a defensible result. The Article demonstrates that if the
proposed standard had been applied, the courts in the recent cases of
Esmark and White would have reached a result that better accommo-
dated the competing interests of the taxpayer and the tax authority. Bet-
ter results are reached under the proposal because it requires scrutiny of
taxpayer actions that achieve tax benefits in a manner not intended by a
statute.
H. OVERVIEW OF U.S. AND BRITISH
JURISPRUDENCE ON SUBSTANCE
OVER FORM
A. United States Cases
In Gregory v. Helvering,32 the U.S. Supreme Court issued the most
important U.S. decision involving substance over form.33 In Gregory, the
taxpayer attempted to reduce her tax liability by using a predecessor of
current section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code,34 which relates to cer-
tain tax-free corporate divisions, in order to obtain shares held by a
wholly-owned corporation. A direct distribution of the shares to the tax-
payer by the corporation would have resulted in a dividend which would
29. Id
30. See infra note 214-216 and accompanying text.
31. Id.
32. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
33. The Supreme Court issued the Gregory decision some fifty years before the doctrine
gained acceptance by British jurists. William D. Popkin, JudicialAnti Tax Avoidance Doctrine
in England: A United States Perspective, 1991 BRIT. TAX REV. 283, 289.
34. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467.
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be taxed at the highest rates.35 Instead, the taxpayer arranged the trans-
fer of the shares to a newly formed corporation, Averill, and the distribu-
tion to herself of all the Averill stock, a transaction which technically
qualified as a tax-free corporate spin-off. The coveted shares were dis-
tributed to the taxpayer in a complete liquidation of Averill and the tax-
payer reported the resulting gain at lower capital gains tax rates.
The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer had received a dividend
on receipt of the shares from Averill.36 The Court acknowledged that a
taxpayer's desire to reduce taxes, standing alone, does not negate benefits
accorded by a tax statute.37 Nonetheless, the Court denied the results
sought by the taxpayer because the transaction was not of the type cov-
ered by the statute. The statute in question accorded certain tax benefits
to a corporate reorganization for business purposes. Because the ar-
rangement constituted a mere device to obtain shares and not "the thing
which the statute intended," the benefits normally accorded a corporate
reorganization were not available.38
Ten years later, in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,39 the
Supreme Court applied the Gregory principle and held that a corporation
sold an apartment building, even though title to the building was actually
transferred by the shareholders. In Court Holding, the corporation had
reached an oral agreement to sell an apartment building. Before execut-
ing a written agreement, however, the corporation called off the negotia-
tions because of tax concerns. The next day, in order to avoid paying tax
on the gain that would result from a sale, the corporation distributed the
building to its shareholders. The shareholders sold the building on sub-
stantially the same terms established by the corporation to one of the
individuals who had negotiated with the corporation, and gave credit
35. A third alternative of a sale of the stock by the corporation and distribution of the
proceeds to Gregory would have resulted in two levels of tax, a tax paid by the corporation on
the gain from the sale and a tax at the highest rates on Gregory's dividend income.
36. In the Second Circuit opinion, Judge Learned Hand reached the same result later
reached by the Supreme Court, but refused to ignore the transfer of the shares to Averill.
Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934). In assessing a deficiency, the Service
had ignored the transfer of the shares, the distribution of the Averill shares to the taxpayer and
the liquidation of Averill, concluding that the entire transaction constituted a declaration of a
dividend by United Mortgage, the corporation that orginally held the transferred shares. IL
at 811.,
37. The celebrated version of the principle that a tax avoidance motive does not foreclose
reliance upon a tax statute was stated by Judge Learned Hand, as follows: "Anyone may so
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's
taxes." Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810 (citation omitted).
38. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
39. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
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against the purchase price for a partial payment previously made to the
corporation.4°
The Supreme Court stated that the corporation had not abandoned
the sales negotiations and that gain from the sale must be attributed to
the corporation.41 The Supreme Court found that a "transaction must be
viewed as a whole" for tax purposes and that:
A sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes into a
sale by another by using the latter as a conduit through which to pass
title... to permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by
mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would seri-
ously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of
Congress.
42
In a sale similar to the one involved in Court Holding, the Supreme
Court reached the opposite result. In United States v. Cumberland Pub.
Serv. Co.,4 the potential purchaser refused the shareholders' offer to sell
the stock of the corporation. The corporation then refused the pur-
chaser's counteroffer to buy certain corporate assets because it wanted to
avoid the large taxable gain that would result from the sale. To avoid the
corporate income tax on the gain from the sale, the corporation distrib-
uted the desired assets and then the shareholders sold those assets.
The Supreme Court stated that whether the corporation or the
shareholders made the sale was a factual question. The Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court holding that the sale had been made by the
shareholders because it found the lower court's conclusion was based on
adequate findings. In Court Holding, the Supreme Court had also af-
firmed the lower court holding which was based on adequate findings
that the sale had been made by the corporation. Despite the different
result, the Supreme Court in Cumberland adhered to the principle stated
in Court Holding that "fact-finding tribunals in tax cases can consider
motives, intent, and conduct in addition to what appears in written in-
40. Id. at 333.
41. Id at 333-34. The Supreme Court found that the Tax Court's findings were binding
because of the application of the rule of Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943)
(providing that a Court of Appeals is bound by the decision of the Tax Court when it cannot
separate factual findings from questions of law "so as to identify a clear-cut mistake of law.").
See Court Holding, 324 U.S. at 333-34. In 1948, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 7482(a) in order to
eliminate the special status accorded Tax Court decisions under Dobaon. MICHAEL 1. SALTZ.
MAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, I 1.03[2][a][ii], at 1-32 (1981). The statute provides
that Tax Court decisions are to be reviewed by the court of appeals "in the same manncr and
to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury." 26
U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1)(1988). See also infra note 209.
42. Court Holding, 324 U.S. at 334 (citation omitted).
43. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
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struments used by parties to control rights as among themselves" to de-
termine who actually makes a sale.'
In Knetsch v. United States,45 the Supreme Court applied the Greg-
ory principle to a circular arrangement to disallow deductions for pay-
ments on an indebtedness purportedly incurred to purchase deferred
annuity savings bonds from an insurance company. The taxpayer
purchased the bonds for a small amount of cash and a four million dollar
nonrecourse loan. On the day of purchase, he prepaid interest for the
first year in the amount of 140,000 dollars. Five days after the purchase,
the taxpayer borrowed from the insurance company 99,000 dollars, the
estimated excess of the cash or loan value of the bonds at the end of the
first year of ownership over the outstanding debt and he prepaid interest
of 3,465 dollars on this loan. For two additional years, the taxpayer pre-
paid interest on the nonrecourse loan, borrowed against the estimated
cash value of the bonds for the coming year, prepaid additional interest,
and then surrendered the bonds. On surrender, the taxpayer's debt was
cancelled.
The Supreme Court noted that if the taxpayer had kept the bonds
until maturity and had continued to borrow against the cash value as
described above, the sum available for an annuity at maturity would be
one thousand dollars, which was enough to provide a monthly annuity of
forty-three dollars. Because it assumed that no rational person would
incur a four million dollar debt for a monthly annuity computed on the
basis of a mere one thousand dollar investment, the Court held that the
taxpayer expected to realize nothing of substance beyond a tax deduc-
tion. Consequently, the Court concluded that the loans were a "fiction"
and a "sham"' and that the taxpayer paid the difference between the
prepaid interest and the amounts "borrowed" back from the insurance
company against the cash surrender value in order to obtain interest de-
ductions. Because the transaction did "not appreciably affect [the tax-
payer's] beneficial interest except to reduce his tax,"' the Supreme Court
found no indebtedness contemplated by the provisions allowing an inter-
est deduction. Therefore, the Court disallowed the taxpayer's
deductions.
Later, courts applied a substance over form approach based upon
Gregory to linear transactions. In McDonald's Restaurants of ill. v. CoM-
44. Id at 454 n.3.
45. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
46. IdL at 365-66.
47. Ia at 366 (quoting Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 411 (2d Cir. 1957) (L
Hand, J., dissenting)).
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missioner,48 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied the step
transaction doctrine to find that a purported tax-free merger was in real-
ity a taxable sale. McDonald's involved a merger of corporations, owned
in whole or in part by certain individuals, called the "Garb-Stem
group,"4 9 into McDonald's parent company.50 Six months after the
merger, the group sold the parent company's common stock, which they
had received in the merger.51
The merger was consummated precisely at the beginning of the first
day of April 1973 in order to accommodate McDonald's desire to use an
accounting method that would permit it to enhance its financial state-
ments52 and to accommodate the Garb-Stem group's desire to exercise
an option to include the parent company stock in an expected June 1973
registration. 3 While McDonald's was not obligated -to undertake a June
registration,54 the group possessed a right to require a registration if one
did not occur within a year after the merger.55  Since the Garb-Stem
group intended from the outset to sell the parent company stock as soon
as possible after the merger, the prospect of early marketability of that
stock provided an inducement to enter into the merger agreement. 6
48. McDonald's Restaurants of Ill. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1987).
49. McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972 (1981), rev'd sub nom. McDon-
ald's Restaurants of Ill. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). The Garb-Stem group
consisted of three individuals, Garb, Stem, and Imerman. The corporations described were
owned in whole or in part by these individuals. The balance of the stock not owned by the
group was held by individuals or trusts. McDonald's of Zion, 76 T.C. at 975 n.2.
50. McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972 (1981), rev'd sub nom. McDon-
ald's Restaurants of Ill. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). The transaction was
structured as a § 332 liquidation of subsidiaries of Distributing Corp. into the parent, Distrib-
uting. Following the liquidation, Distributing and other companies owned in whole or in part
by the taxpayers merged into the McDonald's parent in a statutory merger that qualified as a
reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code. McDonald's of Zion, 76
T.C. at 981. One of the other companies, G.I.S.S. merged into a wholly owned subsidiary of
McDonald's. Id.
51. McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972 (1981), rev'd sub nom. McDon-
ald's Restaurant of Ill. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). The merger was ef-
fected on April 1, 1973 and the sales of stock occurred in October 1973. McDonald's
Restaurants of Ill., 688 F.2d at 522.
52. McDonald's of Zion, 76 T.C. at 977 n.4.
53. IM at 979-80.
54. Id. at 980. The registration was planned by McDonald's. Id. at 978. For the previ-
ous five years, McDonald's had registered shares and sold them to the public. Id at 978 n.9.
55. Id. at 982-84. Although the taxpayers had the right to piggyback their registration on
any registration undertaken by McDonald's, they had no right to demand a registration until
the expiration of a one year period after the merger. Id. at 983-84.
56. Id. at 977-78. Although the group members initially insisted on selling their stock to
the parent for cash only, they were persuaded to exchange stock for stock when the parent
indicated that it would take actions permitting sale of the parent company stock shortly after
the merger. In return for the taxpayer's agreement to accept unregistered parent company
[Vol. 15
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Because of a drop in the market value of its common stock, the par-
ent company postponed the registration until after the stock price had
rebounded in October 1973.17 The Garb-Stem group participated in the
registration and sold nearly all of its stock."8 On its federal income tax
return, the parent company treated the April acquisition as a taxable
event and took a fair market value basis in the acquired assets.59 By
treating the acquisition as taxable and reporting a fair market value basis
in acquired assets, the parent claimed higher depreciation deductions
against income for federal income taxation purposes." For accounting
purposes, in contrast, the parent used a method requiring it to report the
lower historic basis in the property which the acquired corporations had
used.61 Under that method, reported earnings were offset by lower de-
preciation deductions.62 This accounting practice offered the advantage
of allowing the parent to report higher consolidated earnings for financial
statement purposes.63
The Internal Revenue Service (Service) took the position that the
acquisition was not taxable. The Service believed the acquisition quali-
fied as a tax-free Type "A" reorganization." As a consequence, the Ser-
vice maintained that the parent had to compute depreciation deductions
on the basis of the lower historic basis of the acquired corporations,
which resulted in a higher federal income tax liability. 6 The parent
company maintained that the transaction should not be tax-free because
the Garb-Stem group intended at the time of the merger to sell most of
the stock received as soon as possible.66 The parent company argued that
the arrangement for the Garb-Stem group's disposition of the stock of
the subsidiaries prevented the merger from qualifying as a tax-free
reorganization.
The difference in approach between the Service and the parent com-
stock, the parent agreed to permit the Garb-Stem group to include their stock in a registration
planned to take place two months after the merger. Id. at 977-78. Upon registration, the stock
would be marketable. Id. at 982.
57. Id. at 986.
58. Id. at 986-87.
59. Id at 987.
60. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 168, 1011, 1012.
61. The assets were dropped down to subsidiaries in transactions described in § 351 of the
Internal Revenue Code. Under that provision, the subsidiaries take the basis of the property in
the hands of the parent. I.R.C. § 362(a).
62. McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972, 987-88 (1981), rev'd sub nom.
McDonald's Restaurants of I. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.1982).
63. Id at 976-77 n.4
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pany depended upon the applicability of the step transaction doctrine.
The parent company contended67 that the step transaction doctrine ap-
plied and that the court should ignore the group's temporary holding of
the parent company stock as a result of the merger. If the temporary
holding of the stock were ignored, then no shareholder continuity of in-
terest would be demonstrated and the disposition would amount to a
cash sale.68 According to the parent company, the Internal Revenue
Code requires the maintenance of a continuity of shareholder interest as
a prerequisite to the tax-free status of a reorganization. Since the merger
did not involve a continuity of interest, the merger was not tax-free.
In the Service's view, the step transaction doctrine did not apply
because at the time of the merger the Garb-Stem group did not possess
power to effect a subsequent sale of the stock received. 69 The Service
claimed that the group's unilateral action in selling the stock some
months after the. merger constituted a separate event 70
Finding that the step transaction doctrine applied, the Court of Ap-
peals determined that the transfer of the Garb-Stem group's stock in the
subsidiaries in the merger and the subsequent cash sale of the parent
company stock should be treated as one taxable disposition of the stock
of the subsidiaries7 . The court found that the transaction was aimed at
cashing out the Garb-Stem group, which is normally a taxable transac-
tion, under the guise of a tax-free reorganization in order to allow Mc-
Donald's the more favorable accounting treatment. 72 The court found
67. In a reversal of the norm, it was the taxpayer that urged application of the step trans-
action doctrine. For a discussion of the ability of a taxpayer to assert the substance over form
doctrine to obtain a tax result that differs from the one suggested by the form implemented see
generally Robert T. Smith, Substance and Form: A Taxpayer's Right to Assert the Priority of
Substance, 44 TAX LAW 137 (1990).
68. McDonald's of Zion, 76 T.C. 972, 988 n.25 (1981). The term "continuity of interest"
connoted a continuation of an appropriate proprietary interest in the acquiring corporation by
the shareholders of the acquired corporation. Id. at 992-93. See, e.g., Treas. Regs. § 1.368-
l(b) and generally Bernard Wolfman, "Continuity of Interest" and the American Law Institute
Study, 57 TAXES 840 (1979).
69. McDonald's of Zion, 76 T.C. at 994. The Service also argued that at the time of the
merger the group had not formed an intent to sell the parent company stock. Id. at 991. The
Tax Court rejected that argument after a detailed examination of the facts. Id. at 992.
70. Id. at 994.
71. McDonald's of IlL, 688 F.2d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 1982). The Court of Appeals ex-
amined three commonly employed tests. They are: the end result test, the interdependence
test and the binding commitment test. Id. at 524-25. The Court of Appeals adopted none of
those tests. Id.
72. Id. at 524. In a case like McDonald's, it may be difficult to determine the relevant
intention because it is the parent-acquirer and not the seller group that raises the step transac-
tion doctrine as a shield and because it is the taxpayer and not the government raising the
issue. In the normal situation, it is the Service and not the taxpayer that relies on the step
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that the Garb-Stem group had no contractual or other legal obligation to
sell its parent company stock. Nonetheless, the court applied the step
transaction doctrine because "[t]he very detail of the provisions about
how McDonald's would ensure free transferability of the McDonald's
stock owned by the Garb-Stem group shows that they were the quidpro
quo of the merger agreement." 7 The court applied a substance over
form approach because the arrangement demonstrated the taxpayer's
control over the result achieved.
More recent case law demonstrates a reluctance to apply the step
transaction doctrine to reconstruct linear transactions where there are
legitimate business reasons for the additional steps taken by the taxpayer.
In Esmark v. Commissioner,7' the Tax Court accorded great weight to
transaction doctrine. See e.g., id. at 527-28 and Smith, supra note 67. It appears that the
Court of Appeals determined the relevant intention to be that of McDonald's. McDonald's,
688 F.2d at 524. While the intention of the Group may be relevant, if intention is to be at all
pertinent, it seems appropriate to consider the intention of McDonald's because it is the party
that ends up with the tax advantage. It was immaterial to the Garb-Stem group whether the
transaction was treated as a tax-free reorganization or a taxable sale because the merger and
the sale took place in the same taxable year. Under either characterization of the transaction,
the amount of gain or loss realized and recognized ultimately is the same for that group. See
I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1), 1001.
73. 688 F.2d at 525.
74. Esmark v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171, affid, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989). Apart
from issues relevant to the step transaction doctrine, the substantive issues addressed in the
case are no longer critical because of the General Utilities repeal. The General Utilities doc-
trine, enumerated in General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935), permit-
ted a corporation to distribute appreciated property to its shareholders in a nonliquidating
distribution without paying tax on realized gain. Id. at 206. By contrast, tax would be due if
the corporation sold appreciated property to a third party. Id. at 205-06. Similar rules gov-
erned liquidating distributions of appreciated property, but, after 1954, there was no tax im-
posed on gain realized on certain sales of appreciated property prior to distribution of the
proceeds in a complete liquidation. I.R.C. § 336 (repealed in 1987). Critics of the General
Util doctrine argued for its repeal on the ground that there is no difference in substance be-
tween a corporate sale of appreciated property, which is fully taxable, and a corporate distribu-
tion to its shareholders of the same property. See generally Cheryl D. Block, Liquidations
Before and After Repeal of General Utilities, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 308 (1984) and
Bernard Wolfraan, Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: The Case for Repeal of the
General Utilities Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 81 (1985). Consequently, the rule was
eroded gradually. The planners of the transaction in Esmark attempted to meet the require-
ments of one of the remnants of the rule remaining in 1980. 90 T.C. 171, 183 (1988). That
loophole was eliminated in 1982. Lawrence M. Axelrod, Esmark's Tax-Free Disposition of a
Subsidiary: Too Good to be True?, 9 J. CORP. TA'xN 232 (1982) [hereinafter Esmark's Tax-
Free Disposition].
After total repeal (subject to transitional rules) of the General Utilities rule in section
631(c) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (with exceptions for certain corporate reorganizations),
the current rules provide that gain will be recognized upon the distribution or sale of appreci-
ated property by a corporation. See generally, BrrrKER & EUSTICE II, supra note 7, at
7.20-21, 11.06, 11.60-61; BORIS I. BrrKcR & JAMES S. EUSTIE, FEDERAL INcOsi TAX-
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the existence of business objectives in a two-step sale. Esmark had ac-
cepted the bid of Mobil Oil Corporation to acquire nearly all of the stock
of its subsidiary, Vickers,75 in a two-step format specified by Esmark.76
The first step required Mobil to make a cash tender offer to the holders of
approximately fifty-four percent 77 of Esmark stock. In the second step,
Mobil exchanged the Esmark stock received as a result of the tender offer
for approximately ninety-eight percent of the stock of the subsidiary."8
The completion of the tender offer and the exchange occurred on the
same day. Two weeks later, Esmark declared and paid a dividend to its
remaining shareholders of record.
Originally, Esmark had planned to sell the Vickers's stock and buy
back approximately fifty percent of its own stock. The sale of the subsid-
iary's stock was intended to accomplish two goals. First, Esmark antici-
pated that the sale would make Esmark a less attractive takeover target.
Esmark's own stock had been trading at a price substantially less than
management's estimate of the company's value. Esmark expected a re-
structuring involving the sale of the subsidiary, which contained greatly
appreciated assets, and the buy back of approximately fifty percent of
Esmark's stock79 to put the trading price of the stock on par with the
value of the underlying assets of the company. Second, the sale would
lead to a contraction of Esmark's corporate structure because Esmark
would no longer need large amounts of working capital after disposition
of the subsidiary. A redemption of shares with sale proceeds would re-
turn corporate value to shareholders and would place the proceeds out of
the grasp of a possible acquirer.
Esmark substituted a two-step tender offer and redemption format
for the outright sale and redemption. Esmark's management believed
that the two-step format would permit disposition of the subsidiary's
ATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 11 7.21, 11.60, 11.63-64 (4th ed. 1979 &
Supp. 1987 No. 1) [hereinafter BrrrKER & EUSTICE I]; George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate
Liquidations (and Related Matters) After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 42 TAx L. Rvv. 573
(1987). For additional background concerning the Esmark arrangement see Lawrence M. Ax-
elrod, Esmark's Tax-Free Disposition of a Subsidiary: Too Good to Be True?, 9 J. CORP. TAX'N
232 (1982) [hereinafter Esmark's Tax-Free Disposition]. For a discussion of the implications of
the "triumph of form over substance" in Esmark see Josef C. Vitek, Note, Form over Substance
A  Step by Step Analysis: Esmark v. Commissioner, 69 NEB. L. Ri.v. 728, 730 (1990).
75. Esmark, 90 T.C. at 177.
76. Id. The use of the format was a condition of the sale. If Mobil had not accepted the
format, Esmark would have gone to the next lowest bidder. Id.
77. Id. at 173, 177.
78. Id. at 178.
79. Id. at 174. The restructuring was also intended to include the sale of other minor
businesses and struggling food units owned by Esmark. Id.
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stock without recognition of gain80 and would minimize the possibility of
a hostile tender offer by a third party immediately following the disposi-
tion. If there had been an outright sale, retention of cash for even a brief
period between execution of the sale and distribution of the proceeds
might have provoked an attempt by a third party to buy the stock of
cash-rich Esmark at a low market price. In addition, a tender offer by a
third party would eliminate the need for Esmark to establish a fair price
in redeeming its own shares.
The court found that the shareholders acted independently of the
corporation when they sold their shares to Mobil. The Service argued
that the tender offer should be ignored and that the steps taken should be
combined and treated as a sale by Esmark of the subsidiary's shares to
Mobil and a redemption of the stock of the tendering shareholders with
the proceeds of the sale paid directly by Mobil to the shareholders. In
the court's view, acceptance of the Service's characterization of the cho-
sen tender offer/redemption format would ignore the commercial reali-
ties because each step had permanent economic consequences."' Because
80. Id. at 177.
81. Id, at 198. The court was concerned that application of the step transaction doctrine
would ignore the commercial exigencies of the situation. Because Esmark's goals could only
be achieved through two steps whether a tax minimizing or tax maximizing route were taken,
the court believed that the commercial reality of the arrangement would only be respected if
the steps taken by Esmark were honored. In the British case, Craven v. White, [1988] 3 All
E.R. 495, 517 (H.L.), Lord Oliver, writing one of the majority opinions, objected to recon-
struction of legitimate steps taken by the taxpayer because the reconstitution achieved a result
not intended by the parties to the transaction. See discussion of Mhite infra notes 133-45 and
accompanying text.
The approach taken by the Tax Court in Esmark may be explained by reference to what
has been described in British commentary as the "fundamental principle of tax law that the
taxpayer is to be taxed by reference to what he has actually done, and not by reference to what
he might have done to achieve the same object, but which he deliberately chose not to do."
Millett, Artificial Avoidance, supra note 20, at 329. The principle simply expresses the idea
that the form chosen by the taxpayer must govern unless there are good reasons for ignoring it.
See, ag., Tiley, Corporations & Conclusions, supra note 5, at 139 ("Form itself has the merit of
certainty, although this is not to say that it is always easy to determine, but, if one accepts the
limited and functional view of form as being the legal rights and transactions effected by the
parties, one is left with a premise that there ought to be some convincing reason to disregard
those legal facts."). Overriding tax law principles may justify ignoring real steps taken by a
taxpayer. See infra notes 202, 212-214 and accompanying text.
The reverse of the problem of reconstruction of taxpayer events posed by the Tax Court is
that presented when the taxpayer contends that the form it chose should not be determinative.
The argument was made by the taxpayer in Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner, 267
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1959). In Bausch & Lomb, the Second Circuit treated as one transaction the
parent's exchange of stock for assets of a subsidiary (a purported type "C' reorganization) and
a subsequent liquidation of the subsidiary into the parent Id. at 77. Apparently, the taxpayer
did not attempt the alternative of liquidating the subsidiary into the parent because the par-
ent's stock ownership in the subsidiary was less than the 80% (it held only 79.9488%) neces-
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Esmark's commercial goals could only be achieved in a two-step transac-
tion, the use of the two-step transaction which resulted in the lowest tax
liability was not subject to application of the step transaction doctrine.1
2
The court dismissed the argument that to allow nonrecognition of
gain in the Esmark transaction would violate assignment of income prin-
ciples and would accord false substance to the transaction. If applicable,
the assignment of income doctrine 3 would provide that Esmark could
not escape the tax consequences of a cash sale of the Vickers stock by
shifting the actual receipt of the proceeds to its shareholders. According
to the court, application of the doctrine would be justified only if the cash
payment by Mobil was viewed as an integral part of the Esmark sale.
The court found that nonrecognition of gain by Esmark did not run afoul
of assignment of income principles because the shareholders' claims to
sary for a tax-free liquidation. Id at 76. If the exchange of stock for assets had been treated as
separate from the liquidation, the exchange literally would have met the statutory definition of
a type "C" reorganization, an exchange of stock of the parent for all of the assets of the
subsidiary. Id at 77. On the grounds that the two steps were part of the same plan and that
the taxpayer was attempting to "thwart taxation... by carrying out the liquidation process in
two steps instead of one," the court refused to treat the two steps separately. Id. at 78. View-
ing the transactions as a whole, the court found that the parent exchanged both its own stock
and stock of its subsidiary in exchange for the assets, a transaction that did not qualify as a tax-
free type "C" reorganization. Id. at 77. Significantly, the court rejected the taxpayer's argu-
ment that it nonetheless should treat the exchange and liquidation as tax-free because it would
have qualified as a tax-free type "A" reorganization if it had been structured as a merger. Id.
at 78. It rejected the argument on the ground that the taxpayer could not urge a result based
upon a form of transaction not employed. Id. Consistent with the above discussion, the ra-
tionale for refusing to consider a form not chosen by the taxpayer must be that there are good
reasons for the refusal. Thus, a court would be justified in according the same treatment to a
taxpayer's transaction that it would to another transaction not chosen by the taxpayer if such a
result were consistent with the intent of a statute. The Bausch & Lomb court correctly failed to
treat the taxpayer's unsuccessful type "C" reorganization as a type "A" reorganization be-
cause it would not be consistent with the intention of the reorganization provisions. This
resulted because the taxpayer's failed type "C" reorganization lacked the attributes of the type
"A" reorganization provisions. The reason given by the court, however, was that the taxpayer
was bound by the form chosen. See generally, BITrKER & EusTic- II, supra note 7, at 1
14.53[4] (Professors Bittker and Eustice suggest possible alternatives to the Bausch & Lomb
structure that may accomplish the result sought in that case). For a discussion of a taxpayer's
right to disavow a form of transaction chosen, see Smith, supra note 67; see also Tiley, US.
Alternatives, supra note 11, at 185 (If the substance over form doctrine is an anti-tax avoidance
doctrine, a taxpayer may not raise it and is bound by the form chosen, but if the doctrine is
part of "a general reappraisal of what courts do in tax cases," a taxpayer may raise it). Id,
82. The Tax Court decision was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Es-
mark Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171 (1988), affid, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).
83. The assignment of income doctrine provides that a taxpayer may not escape taxation
by an anticipatory arrangement designed to prevent income from vesting in the one who
earned it. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). See also Salvatore v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M.
89 (1970) and Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
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the amounts tendered by Mobil did not derive from their relationship
with Esmark.
In concluding that payment to Esmark shareholders was unrelated
to the sale of Vickers's stock, the court ignored the effect upon sharehold-
ers' rights of the Esmark-Mobil agreement, which required Mobil to
make a tender offer for the agreed number of shares at a fixed price per
share. The government's argument assumed that the shareholders' right
to payment depended upon Esmark's sales agreement. In the court's
view, however, the shareholders possessed an independent claim against
Mobil based on the tender offer. Their rights to payment by Mobil arose
upon the tender of shares in response to Mobil's offer to purchase. Be-
cause the court found that income earned by Esmark had not been
shifted to its shareholders, the court refused to ignore the first step of the
transaction by attributing Mobil's payment for the stock to Esmark.
The court offered two reasons for concluding that the substance did
not differ from the form. First, it found inapplicable the Court Holding
rule," which provided that a sale made in substance by a corporation
could not be disguised as a sale by shareholders in order to eliminate a
level of taxation. The court refused to restructure the Esmark transac-
tion in the fashion of Court Holding because Mobil was not a mere 'con-
duit' or 'intermediary.' The court found that Mobil could not be
regarded as an intermediary because Mobil had *an actual obligation to
purchase stock tendered by the shareholders while Esmark had no such
obligation.85
Second, the court determined that the step transaction doctrine did
not require integration of the two steps taken in Esmark given the defini-
tion of the step transaction doctrine as: "[A]nother rule of substance over
form that 'treats a series of formally separate "steps" as a single transac-
tion if such steps are integrated, interdependent, and focused toward a
particular result.' "86 According to the court, the doctrine would not
84. The rule is based upon Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945),
which held that a sale of property by shareholders to avoid two levels of gain recognition was
to be treated as a sale by the corporation. See discussion of the rule infra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text. The uncertainty regarding application of the Court Holding rule to similar
sales was demonstrated by the result in Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 338 U.S.
451 (1950), where the Supreme Court reached the opposite result in a case involving nearly
identical facts.
85. Esmark, 90 T.C. 171, 194. The government argued that the Court Holding rule would
require that Mobil be treated as a conduit. The court's refusal to treat Mobil as a conduit may
be based upon the lack of a relationship between Esmark and Mobil like the one between
shareholder and wholly-owned corporation in Court Holding.
86. Esmark Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171, 195 (1988) aff'd 886 F.2d 1318 (7th
Cir.1989)(citing Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428 (1987).
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apply to combine steps unless, in addition to an overall plan, a series of
individually meaningless steps was present. While the facts demon-
strated the presence of an overall plan, it did not involve meaningless
steps. The court found that each step was necessary to accomplish Es-
mark's goals of disposing of Vickers and redeeming a substantial portion
of its stock.
B. British Cases
The most significant of the early British cases involving the concept
of substance over form is Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Duke of
Westminster,87 which involved contracts entered into by the Duke to en-
able him to deduct certain payments to employees for income surtax pur-
poses. The House of Lords found that the Duke could deduct amounts
payable weekly for a period of years under a deed to employees in consid-
eration of past services even though payments for current services would
not be deductible. The majority found that the agreed amounts were
deductible because they did not represent payment fbr current services
and the employees had a contractual right to insist on payment of salary
in addition to amounts received under the deed.
In one of the majority opinions of the House of Lords, Lord Tomlin
stated that:
[I]n revenue cases there is a doctrine that the Court may ignore the
legal position and regard what is called "the substance of the matter"
.... This so-called doctrine of "the substance" seems to me to be
nothing more than an attempt to make a man pay notwithstanding
that he has so ordered his affairs that the amount of tax sought from
him is not legally claimable .... [H]ere the substance is that which
results from the legal rights and obligations of the parties ascertained
upon ordinary legal principles .... 88
Lord Tomlin's statement was interpreted to mean that "form (is] to be
preferred to substance" in British tax law. 9
Floor v. Davis 90 demonstrates the ascendancy of form over sub-
stance for some forty years after Duke of Westminster. In Floor, the tax-
87. Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Duke of Westminster, [1935] All E.R. 383 (H.L.).
88. Id. at 390-91.
89. Millett, Artificial.Avoidance, supra note 20 at 333. Another interpretation of the im-
port of Duke of Westminster was that for tax purposes the only significant aspects of a transac-
tion were the "strict legal rights and obligations" created. Id. at 334. Both interpretations
correctly describe the general approach taken by the British courts until the advent of the
Ramsay and Dawson doctrines, discussed infra notes 94-114, 121-32 and accompanying text,
See Millett, id. at 336.
90. Floor v. Davis, [1978] 2 All E.R. 1079 (C.A.).
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payers transferred shares of stock to a wholly-owned corporation that
sold the shares to the ultimate purchaser. Neither the taxpayers nor the
intermediary recognized a gain on the transfer of the shares. Shortly
after the sale, the intermediary distributed most of the proceeds to a for-
eign corporation not subject to taxation in the U.K. The majority re-
fused to view the transfer to the intermediary as a disposal of the shares
for capital gains tax purposes under a form over substance approach.
The majority rejected the Inland Revenue's91 argument that the transac-
tion between the intermediary and the ultimate purchaser should be
viewed as a sale by the taxpayers. The court found no disposition by the
taxpayers after the first two steps of the Floor transaction on the ground
that each step should be given separate legal effect.92
The dissenter, Lord Eveleigh, stated that the first two steps should
be viewed as one under a type of substance over form rationale. He
maintained that:
Mhe court is not required to consider each step taken in isolation. It
is a question of whether or not the shares were disposed of to [the
ultimate purchaser] by the taxpayer. I believe that they were. Fur-
thermore, they were in reality at the disposal of the original sharehold-
ers until the moment they reached the hand of [the ultimate
purchaser], although the legal ownership was in [the intermediary].
9 3
Lord Eveleigh's willingness to consider substance as well as form
was adopted by the House of Lords in W. T Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners.94 Ramsay involved two cases in which two tax-
91. U.K. tax cases are first heard by General or Special Commissioners who are the fact
finders. 42 HALSBURG'S STATUTES 11-12 (4th ed. 1989). Appeals are to the High Court, the
Court of Appeal and, finally, the House of Lords. I.F. Avery Jones, The New Approach in UK
Tax Law - Where Do We Stand? 5 AsLAN-PAcIrc TAX & INVESTMENT BULL. 414, 417
(1987). Leave to appeal to the House of Lords must be granted by the Court of Appeal or by
the House of Lords appellate committee. P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND
SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw 275 (1987).
92. Floor v. Davis, [1978] 2 All E.RL at 1084. This resulted even though a recital in the
agreement of transfer between the taxpayers and the intermediary indicated that the transfer
was "with a view to" the intermediary selling the shares to the ultimate purchaser. Id. at
1085-86. Despite the differences in the approaches of the majority and the dissenter Lord
Eveleigh, all of the justices ultimately agreed that the taxpayers were liable for a capital gains
tax on the transfer of the shares. Id.
93. Id. at 1089.
94. W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs., [1981] 1 All E.RL 865 (H.L). Ram-
say also involved consideration of an appeal in Eilbeck v. Rawling. In Ramsay, Lord Fraser
found the portion of Lord Eveleigh's opinion in Floor to contain "reasoning equally applica-
ble" to the Ramsay and Rawling transactions. Id. at 882. Some commentators find it a signifi-
cant difference that in Floor the sales price was returned to the taxpayers, while in Dawson it
was retained by the intermediary. Tiley, U.S Alternatime. Part II, supra note I, at 243.
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payers, the Ramsay company (Ramsay) and a Mr. Rawling, attempted to
offset taxable capital gains by capital losses generated in transactions en-
tered into for the sole purpose of avoiding or reducing tax.95 The Ram-
say scheme involved an attempt to create a capital loss to reduce or
eliminate a capital gain realized from the sale of farming property. 6
Under a plan designed by tax consultants, Ramsay made two loans of
equal amount97 to Caithmead, a wholly-owned company whose stock
had been acquired on the date of the loans. Initially, both loans bore the
same interest rate, but Ramsay possessed the ability to reduce the rate on
one and correspondingly increase the rate on the other.
Several days after making the loans, Ramsay exercised its option
and decreased the interest rate on the first loan to zero and doubled the
rate on the second loan. 98 On the same day, the note for the second loan
was sold at a gain. The taxpayer claimed that the gain realized on the
sale of the note was not subject to capital gains tax.99 The first loan was
repaid to Ramsay a week later. As a result of the loan transactions with
Ramsay, the stock of Caithmead fell in value. Thus, when Ramsay sold
its Caithmead stock, it sustained a loss equal to the difference between
the amount originally paid for the stock and the amount received from
an unrelated purchaser."° Ramsay argued that the loss on the sale of the
Caithmead stock could be used to offset the gain on the sale of farming
property because the loss was not offset by the nontaxable gain on the
note.
Viewing the transaction as a whole, Lord Wilberfbrce found that the
taxpayer sustained no gain or loss because the gain on the sale of the note
and the loss on the sale of the stock were not separable from one an-
other. 101 He based his conclusion upon the lack of a business purpose for
the steps taken, the nature of the transaction as one in which all steps
would be completed despite the absence of a binding arrangement to do
so, and the intention of the taxpayer to produce no actual gain or loss. 102
The court reached a similar result in the case involving Mr. Rawl-
ing.'03 Rawling involved a scheme to split a reversion interest in a trust
in order to create a capital gain not subject to tax and a capital loss that
95. Ramsay [1981] 1 All E.R. at 870.
96. Id. at 878.






103. Id. at 877.
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could be used to offset a taxable capital gain.">' With funds borrowed
from a corporation that marketed the scheme,10 5 the taxpayer, Rawling,
purchased a reversion in a trust"6 set up in Gibraltor. 0 7 The next day
the taxpayer, as authorized by the terms of the trust, requested that the
trustee transfer approximately half of the trust fund's capital to a second
trust in Jersey created by the taxpayer.103 No actual transfer of funds
from the Gibraltar trust occurred because the corporate lender/marketer
made the transfer directly to the Jersey trust by book entry."°9 Rawling
planned to "manipulate" basis and value in his trust interests by inflating
basis and deflating value in the Gibraltor trust so as to create an allowa-
ble loss. In addition, Rawling planned to deflate basis and increase value
in the Jersey trust to create a gain exempt from capital gains tax.' °
As a result of the transfer to the Jersey trust, Rawling became a
"person for whose benefit a reversion had been created" ' and capital
gains tax provisions exempted any gain on the sale of that reversion.
12
However, no exemption from those provisions for a loss sustained as a
result of the sale of the reversion in the Gibraltor trust existed because
the taxpayer had acquired his interest for consideration in money.
1 13
Rawling sold his reversion in the Jersey trust, generating a purported
gain that was exempt from capital gains tax. He sold his interest in the
Gibraltor trust for substantially less than he had paid for it and reported
a loss, which he claimed to be allowable under the capital gains provi-
sions. He used this loss to reduce a capital gain realized in a separate
transaction. Rawling made both sales to parties related to the promoter-
lender. The sales price for the two reversion interests was credited
against the loan incurred by Rawling to purchase the Gibraltor trust.
Rawling paid the lender a small balance due and the lender released
Rawling from any obligation to repay the loan.'
1 4
Lord Wilberforce held that the marketer of the scheme provided all
104. Id at 876.
105. Id
106. Id
107. Id at 876, 881.
108. Id at 876.
109. Id at 882. The transfer directly to the Jersey trust avoided a transfer from the lender,
Thun, to the Gibraltor trust and then from the Gibraltor trust to the Jersey trust. Id at 876-
77.
110. Id at 874.
111. Id at 877.
112. Id at 876.
113. Id
114. Id at 877. The only other sums paid by Rawling were a small promotion fee and a
small amount of interest on the loan.
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of the funds used in the transactions and that the taxpayer merely paid
fees for the use of the marketer's money and trust arrangements. As a
result, Lord Wilberforce found that the taxpayer had merely purchased a
manufactured tax loss. He also found that the structure of the arrange-
ment allowed the borrowed funds to be returned to the lender under
steps within the control of the promoter. Moreover, the pre-arranged
transactions were aimed at returning all participants to their starting po-
sitions in a short period of time. Accordingly, Lord Wilberforce found
that it would be wrong to view the steps separately and to give independ-
ent effect to each. Consistent with his view of the intention of the parties,
Wilberforce concluded that a tax nullity resulted from the integrated
steps.
The Ramsay court's new approach to tax-avoiding circular transac-
tions gained acceptance. Shortly after Ramsay, the House of Lords in
Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Burmah115 disallowed a loss purport-
edly sustained by a parent company on the liquidation of Holdings, one
of its wholly-owned 116 subsidiaries, on the ground that no real loss cogni-
zable for capital gains tax purposes occurred. In Burmah, the parent
company attempted to deduct a loss resulting from an uncollectible debt
owed by the subsidiary. Originally, the parent transferred certain British
Petroleum (BP) shares to the subsidiary, Holdings, in partial payment of
a debt. The books reflected the excess of the fair market value of the BP
shares over the debt owed by the parent as a debt owed the subsidiary to
the parent. While Holdings held the BP shares, the fair market value
declined. As a result, when Holdings transferred the BP shares back to
the parent, the debt owed the parent as a result of the original transfer
remained outstanding in the amount of the decline in fair market value of
shares.
1 17
Although the subsidiary could not repay the debt, the parent could
not claim a bad debt deduction because the debt was not "on a secur-
ity." '118 In order to obtain a bad debt deduction, the parent loaned funds
to a second wholly-owned subsidiary, Manchester Oil Refinery Holdings
Ltd. (MORH), that loaned the funds to Holdings, who repaid the debt to
the parent. A few days later, the parent purchased additional stock in
115. Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Burmah Oil Co. Ltd., [1982] B.T.C. 56.
116. The parent company, Burmah, owned all but one share of Holdings. That share was
owned by another of Burmah's subsidiaries.
117. The amount outstanding consisted of the difference between the fair market value
when the shares were transferred by the parent and the fair market value when transferred
back to the parent.
118. Burmah, [1982] B.T.C. at 59. The taxpayer argued that the statutory requirement ofa
debt on a security was unfair and harsh. Id. at 64.
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Holdings for an amount which Holdings used to repay the debt to
MORK. MORH immediately repaid the debt owed the parent. Hold-
ings was soon liquidated.
In the court's view, the relevant statute technically permitted a loss
deduction for capital gains tax purposes in an amount equal to the differ-
ence between the sum distributed on liquidation and the amount paid by
the parent for the Holdings shares. In this case, the amount was
equivalent to the debt owed by Holdings to the parent. The court did not
allow the loss because "although [the parent] apparently suffered the loss
of almost the whole price that it had paid for the new shares... it suf-
fered no real loss because it got back [almost] all the money" in the circu-
lar lending scheme." 9 In addition, the parent retained the BP shares
which it could have sold at a loss in the open market. The court con-
cluded that there was "no real loss and no loss in the sense contemplated
by the legislation."' 2
The House of Lords applied the approach in Ramsay and Burmah
to the facts of Furniss v. Dawson, 2 ' which involved a linear transaction.
In Dawson, the taxpayer and members of his family informally agreed to
sell stock in two clothing manufacturing companies to another company,
Wood Bastow.11 Heeding advice of their solicitors, the taxpayers made
the sale through use of an intermediary. With the approval of the ulti-
mate purchaser, the shares to be sold were transferred in a purportedly
tax-free transaction to Greenjacket, an Isle of Man company, in ex-
change for all of the stock of Greenjacket. 11 On the same day, Green-
jacket sold the shares received in the transfer to the ultimate
purchaser.' 24 The taxpayers contended that they did not owe any capital
gains tax on the sale proceeds 25 because the sale had technically been
119. Id at 64.
120. Id
121. Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E.R. 530 (H.L.).
122. Id at 536-37.
123. The Finance Act of 1965, § 19, provided an exception from the imposition of the
capital gains tax where a taxpayer transfers control of one company to another in an exchange
of stock. Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E.R. at 538. Under the statute such a transfer was
not a "disposal" requiring payment of a tax on the gain. Transactions like the one in Dawson
became the subject of 1977 legislation. That legislation requires recognition of gain in an ex-
change of shares unless the transaction is undertaken for bona fide commercial purposes and is
not part of a scheme to avoid capital gains tax liability. Stefan M. Frommel, United Kingdom
Tax Law and Abuse of Rights, 2 INTERTAX 54, 60-61 (1991).
124. Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E.R. at 537.
125. Id at 538. As noted by Lord Brightman, the Dawson transaction involved "not a tax
avoidance scheme, but a tax deferment scheme." Id at 536. A capital gains tax would be due
on the taxpayers' eventual disposition of the Greenjacket stock because that stock retained the
same tax basis held in the stock in the manufacturing companies. Id at 538. If the Dawsons
19921
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
effected by their wholly-owned company, Greenjacket, which had real-
ized no gain subject to tax.
126
Speaking for a unanimous court, Lord Brightman 127 found that the
two steps consisting of a transfer to the intermediary and a sale to the
ultimate purchaser amounted to a one-step disposition of the stock by the
taxpayers for a price equal to the amount paid by the ultimate purchaser
to the intermediary. 128  The governing standard from Ramsay" 9 and
Burmah130 provided that an intervening step is to be ignored if it forms
part of a preordained series of transactions or a single composite transac-
tion and if it has no commercial or business purpose other than the
avoidance of a tax liability.1 31 In the event that both conditions exist and
the intervening steps are ignored, a court must look at the end result of
the transaction and tax it in accordance with the pertinent taxing stat-
ute.1 32 Lord Brightman held that the correct application of that stan-
dard resulted in a finding of a taxable disposal by the taxpayers.
Eventually, the majority limited the application of a substance over
form approach in linear transactions in Craven v. White. 133 In White, a
majority of the House of Lords1 34 found that the step transaction doc-
trine did not apply when a series of transactions possessed at least one
business purpose and the effect of the series was not preordained. White
involved the propriety of viewing a two step transferral of property from
the taxpayer to a related party, which disposed of the property to a third
party, as a one step disposition by the taxpayer directly to the third
party. To determine whether a series of transactions may be regarded as
a whole under step transaction doctrine, the court concluded that the
primary inquiry is whether the steps properly may be regarded as
were to sell the Greenjacket stock at its fair market value of £152,000, gain would be realized
and recognized as if the stock of the manufacturing companies had been sold. Id.
126. Greenjacket purchased the shares of the manufacturing companies owned by the tax-
payers for £152,000 (paid by the issuance of Greenjacket shares presumably worth £152,000).
Thoses shares were sold to Wood Bastow for the identical price. Id. at 537.
127. For a comparison with the approach taken by Lord Bridge in Dawson see discussion
infra note 152 and accompanying text.
128. Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E.R. at 544.
129. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text.
131. Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E.R. at 543. See also Jones, supra note 91, at 415 n.6
(1987).
132. Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E.R. at 543.
133. Craven v. White, [1988] 3 All E.R. 495 (H.L.).
134. Id. at 495. The decision emcompassed three separate actions. Lord Templeman and
Lord Goff dissented regarding the result reached by the majority in one of the actions and the




After examining the three separate business transactions presented,
the majority held that none of the transactions involved preordained
steps. 136 According to the court, a two-step transaction is not pre-
ordained and will not be viewed as a one-step transaction, if it is either
"wholly uncertain" whether the second step will take place or the iden-
tity of the purchaser or any other terms of the second step are not known
at the time of the first step.'3 7 A transaction properly may be regarded as
preordained if there is a contractual agreement or the taxpayer is in a
position to procure the occurrence of the second step at the time of the
first step. A taxpayer is in a position to carry a series of steps to comple-
tion when all steps are determined in advance "by a guiding will" of the
taxpayer.
3 8
The first transaction in White'"9 depended upon the ability of the
taxpayer-company to sell land through five associated companies. The
purpose was to split the income from the sale of the land among the five
companies in order to maximize the availability of an exemption from a
development land tax.i 4 The taxpayer had acquired the land from a
related corporation that had negotiated to sell the land to Milton, a third
unrelated company but had not finalized a contract. More than a year
after the transfer to the five related companies, the five companies sold
the land to Milton. The court found no connection between the transfer
to the five companies and the subsequent sale to Milton sufficient to jus-
tify a finding that the two steps were preordained. Consequently, it re-
jected the Inland Revenue's argument that the sale by the five companies
should be viewed as a sale by the taxpayer.
141
In the second transaction 4 ' considered by the House of Lords, indi-
135. I at 527-28.
136. Id at 515.
137. Id at 528.
138. Id at 500.
139. Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Bowater Property Developments Ltd [1988] 3 All FR. 495
(H.L.) (decided in Craven v. White, [1988] 3 All E.R. 495 (H.L.).
140. A sale of the land by five companies would minimize tax liability because each could
claim the £50,000 land tax exemption. White, [1988] 3 All E.R. 495. A sale ofthe land by one
owner would result in only a £50,000 exemption. Id at 501. The relevant portions of the
Development Land Tax Act of 1976 were repealed by the 1985 Finance Act. HALSOURY'S
LAWS OF ENGLAND 551, at 58. (4th ed. Supp. 1990). The transfer to the taxpayer was for
97-1/2 percent offair market value. White, [1988] 3 All ER. at 501. The transfers to the five
related companies were for fair market value. Id
141. Id
142. Baylis v. Gregory [1988] 3 All E.R. 495 (H.L.) (decided in Craven v. White,[1988] 3
Al E.R. 495 (H.L.)).
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vidual taxpayers, who were negotiating the sale of stock in a family cor-
poration, planned to transfer those shares to an Isle of Man corporation,
Holdings, prior to the sale. Although negotiations with a prospective
purchaser, Cannon Ltd, were halted, the taxpayers nonetheless trans-
ferred their shares in the family corporation to Holdings in exchange for
shares in that company. Nearly two years later, Holdings sold the family
corporation's shares to an individual. As in the case of the first transac-
tion, the House of Lords refused to find a sale by the individual taxpayers
directly to the individual purchaser because the steps were not
preordained.
The third transaction143 concerned attempts by shareholders in a
family corporation to dispose of their interest either by merger or out-
right sale. The shareholders pursued negotiations toward a possible
merger with one company, Cee-N-Cee, or purchase by another, Oriel. In
contemplation of a merger with Cee-N-Cee, the shareholders planned to
acquire an Isle of Man company, Millor, to serve as a vehicle for the
merger. 1" Eventually, the shareholders exchanged their stock in the
family corporation for the stock of Millor. A few weeks later, Oriel's
subsidiary purchased those shares from Millor. Millor loaned most of
the sale proceeds to the taxpayers, who were the former shareholders of
the family company.
The court found that the share exchange with Millor, the sale to
Oriel's subsidiary, and the loans to the taxpayers did not constitute a
composite transaction made up of a preordained serdes of transactions.
Consequently, the court rejected the trial court's finding that the taxpay-
ers disposed of a part of their family company shares each time they
received a loan from Millor. The House of Lords found no disposition of
the shares by the taxpayers directly to Oriel's subsidiary because at the
time of the transfer of the shares to Millor the sale to Oriel was not a
certainty.
145
143. Craven v. White, [1988] 3 All E.R. at 495.
144. Id. at 502, 515. The taxpayers were aware of the advantages offered by the use of the
Isle of Man company even if the outright sale, as opposed to the merger, occurred.
145. Id. at 530. This legal conclusion rested upon a factual finding by the Commissioners
that the family company shares were transferred to Millor for the primary purpose of effecting
the sale to Oriel's subsidiary. Id. at 502. The Commissioners also found that the transfer was
accomplished in order to achieve either the merger or the sale. Id. at 502, 529-530. The
majority of the House of Lords took both of these factual findings to mean that there was no
practical certainty that the sale to the subsidiary would take place and it concluded that the
Commissioners had improperly applied the Dawson principle. Id. at 503, 530. The House
noted that its decision in Dawson, and hence the proper formulation of the principle, had not
been reached at the time the Commissioners in White rendered their decision. Id. at 502,
Lord Templeman disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the step transaction doctrine
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Following White, courts have noted the limited use of a substance
over form approach in linear transactions.' 46 In Shepherd v. Lyntress
Ltd.," for example, the Chancery Division applied a "restated" Ramsay
principle to find that gain from a sale of stock by subsidiaries should not
be attributed to the parent company. 14 Lyntress Ltd. involved the acqui-
sition of all of the stock of Lyntress and Salcombe, companies with sub-
stantial losses, by the parent, News. After the acquisition, the parent
transferred stock in three other companies, LWT, News Corporation and
Broken Hill, to Lyntress and Salcombe. The transfer to Lyntress and
Salcombe allowed the gain, which was expected to be realized on resale,
to be offset by the losses of Lyntress and Salcombe.
The Inland Revenue Commissioners maintained that the acquisition
of Lyntress and Salcombe by the parent, the transfer of the LWT, News
Corporation, and Broken Hill stock to the acquired companies, and the
acquired companies' sale of the LWT, News Corporation, and Broken
Hill stock to be part of a composite transaction similar to the one found
in Dawson. Accordingly, they concluded that the sale had been made by
the parent, which precluded the offset of the gains on the sale against the
losses of Lyntress and Salcombe.149
The court found the transfer of shares by the parent with a view to a
sale by Lyntress and Salcombe did not justify finding a composite trans-
did not apply to the third transaction in While. In his view, the doctrine applied to the third
transaction even though it was uncertain at the time of the initial step whether the taxpayer
would take either of two alternative second steps. He rejected the conclusion, reached in the
three majority opinions, that the step transaction doctrine would not apply unless the negotia-
tions for the second step were at an advanced stage at the time of the first. Lord Templeman
stated that the crucial question was whether the two transactions formed part of a single
scheme. Applying Lord Templeman's approach, a single scheme could be found and two steps
could be linked, if the taxpayer had the power to carry out the second step at the time of the
first and if the taxpayer did in fact accomplish the second step.
146. See Frommel, supra note 123, at 72.
147. Shepherd v. Lyntress Ltd., [1989] B.T.C. 346 (Ch.).
148. Lyntress involved another issue not discussed in the text: whether a sale of 35% of the
stock of a subsidiary on one day followed by the'sale of the balance two days later should be
treated as a sale of 100% on the second day. If all of the stock were sold on the second day,
the subsidiary would be unable to deduct certain losses allowable when it ceased to be a mem-
ber of a related group of companies. The court found that the two step sale was part of a
composite transaction, but that the first step was motivated by business considerations,
namely, the desire to avoid creating rights in certain parties outside the related group of com-
panies to buy the subsidiary's stock. Even assuming no business purpose for the first step, the
court found that treating the arrangement as "a single transaction, which, once the first step
has been taken, proceeded inevitably to its preordained end" would require it to treat the sale
of 100% as taking place on the first day. In that event, the loss of the subsidiary would be
allowable.
149. On the sale of the Broken Hill shares, Lyntress realized a loss. If the shares had been
sold by the parent, News, a gain would have been realized.
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action because the parent had not taken "any step.., to place the shares
... for sale through the Stock Exchange[s]." 150 Moreover, the court held
that it was not significant that a desire to minimize tax led to the interme-
diate step. Describing the concept of substance over form as a "principle
of [statutory] construction,""15 the court noted that the pertinent statute
sanctioned the tax avoidance step taken by permitting aggregation of
gains and losses by affiliated companies in specific instances. Under these
circumstances, the court decided not to ignore the form adopted by the
parties. Consequently, the court found that the subsidiaries, and not the
parent, realized gain on the sales of the transferred stock.
C. Comparison of U.S. and U.K. Approaches
The established view has been that the U.S. and U.K. courts ap-
proach anti-tax avoidance doctrine differently.' 52 In general, the U.S.
courts have been more willing to disregard steps taken by taxpayers in
order to reach an appropriate tax result.153 The differences may be ex-
plained by several factors: the legislative authority of the House of Com-
mons over all legislation,'54 the broad definition of the term "income" for
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Tiley, US. Alternatives, supra note 11, at 180-81 (The course taken by "the House
of Lords to tackle the problem of the types of tax avoidance scheme being peddled in the early
1970s is both strong and right; so far it has proved to be much narrower (at least in formula-
tion) than United States tests and has therefore avoided Learned Hand's criticism [that the
U.S. tests generate uncertainty and lack intellectual credibility]."). But see Millett, Art Uclal
Avoidance, supra note 20, at 338-39 (Justice Millett finds that, after Ramsay and Dawson, the
U.S. and U.K. tests are "remarkably similar." Id. at 339). Professor Tiley notes that the
British opinion, Dawson, "opens the way for a broad doctrine based on substance over form"
in the U.S. style. Tiley, U.S. Alternatives, supra note 11, at 184. He concludes, however, that
Lord Bridge's approach is, on close examination, based on the "interdependent steps version"
of the U.S. step transaction doctrine, a narrower approach. Id.
153. ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 91, at 76 n.l1 (1987).
154. See Tiley, US. Alternatives, supra note 11, at 186. Considering this factor and the
domination of the legislature by the executive, Professor Tiley believes that the U.K. differs
from the U.S. because in the U.K. the "tax consequences of changes in the general law can be
foreseen and, if necessary those changes can be delayed or amended to take account of the
fiscal consequences." Id. By contrast, in the U.S., the operation of federal taxation law is
affected by various state law rules. In order to accommodate the dual system of laws, federal
courts have adopted the rule that state law determines the legal rights of the parties and federal
law determines the consequences. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
In Professor Tiley's view, the dichotomy is important because "tax law is primarily con.
cerned with the consequences of legal relations established between parties." Tiley, U.S. Alter.
natives, supra note 11, at 186. It is this Article's view that the distinction is not significant




U.S. income tax purposes in contrast to the U.K.'s schedular system,
1 5'
the relatively earlier acceptance by the U.S. courts 56 of anti-avoidance
theory, and the greater willingness of the U.S. courts to invoke general
principles157 of tax law.158 While the decisions of the House of Lords in
the Ramsay'59 and Dawson'60 cases suggested movement toward the U.S.
approach, the decision of the majority in White 61 ended that trend.
Much commentary has considered the potentially pernicious or, alterna-
tively, beneficial impact of U.S. doctrines upon the U.K. courts. 162 How-
155. Tiley, U.S. Alternatives, supra note 11, at 186. See JOHN A. KAY & M. A. KING, THE
BRiTISH TAX SYSTEM 21 (5th ed. 1990).
156. See supra notes 6-18 and accompanying text.
157. Tiley, U.S. Alternatives, supra note 11, at 190-95. A court's willingness to invoke a
general principle of tax law rests at levels seven, eight and nine of the nine levels of analysis in
a tax case suggested by Professor Tiley. The first five levels concern the ascertainment of facts
and the application of general and tax law rules. The last four, and perhaps the most impor-
tant, involve: questions of statutory construction, including the effect of other provisions and
the policy of a particular provision (level 6); invocation of a general principle of tax law (level
7); spasmodic application of general doctrines such as anti.avoidance doctrines (level 8); and
broad principles related to feelings about what the law ought to be (level 9). Id. A result
obtained at a higher level of reasoning would supplant one obtained at a lower level.
158. According to Professor Tiley differences may also be explained on the ground that
"the intellectual structure of the United States tax system and the administrative structure that
underpins it are very different from [the British]." Tiley, U.S. Alternatives, supra note 11, at
180. But see Millett, Artificial Avoidance, supra note 20, at 328-30 (maintaining that adoption
by British courts of U.S. precedents is legitimate because both common law jurisdictions share
fundamental legal principles - e.g., taxation is a matter of statutory construction, tax avoid-
ance is legitimate, a taxpayer is not to be taxed by reference to what she might have done and
the motive with which a taxpayer enters into a transaction is irrelevant).
Tiley describes other differences in the type of legislation enacted in each country (U.S.
legislation is "much more prone to introduce relatively woolly concepts and leave matters to
the courts to resolve.. . ."), in the ability of the respective courts to consult legislative history
and in the provision of administrative guidance to taxpayers. Tiley, U.& Alternatives, supra
note 11, at 187-88.
159. W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1981] 1 All E.R. 865 (H.L.).
160. Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E.R. 530 (H.L.).
161. Craven v. White, [1988] 3 All E.R. 495 (H.L.).
162. Compare Tiley, U.S. Alternatives, supra note 11, at 181 ("[W]hile many of the United
States ideas merit consideration, their history also carries warnings; importing bleeding chunks
of alien doctrine could prove extremely dangerous.") with Millett, Artficial Avoidance, supra
note 20 at 338-39 ("So, after a journey that has taken 50 years, we [the English courts] have at
last found a solution to the problem of artificial tax avoidance; and it turns out to be remarka-
bly similar to that expounded by Learned Hand J. [in the Gregory case] in 1934. It is not based
merely on rhetoric or prejudice against the tax-avoider, but on sound logic and legal reason-
ing."). See also Tiley, Judicial Anti-avoidance Doctrine" Some Problem Areas, 1988 Barr.
TAX. REV. 63, 103 (comparing differences in treatment of various issues by the U.S. and Brit-
ish courts and concluding that the British courts have "resisted invitations" to go as far as
some of the U.S. courts have gone to combat tax avoidance.) [hereinafter Tiley, Some Problem
Areas]; Tiley, U.S. Alternatives; Part II, supra note 1; Tiley, Corporations & Conclusions, supra
note 5.
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ever, the recent Esmark decision indicates that U.S. theory may be
moving toward the more formalistic approach taken by the U.K. courts.
HI. CRITICISM OF THE CONVERGENCE OF U.S. AND
BRITISH ANALYSIS: COMMERCIAL GOALS
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
ECLIPSE REVENUE GOALS
In their approval of tax avoidance schemes as part of legitimate
business plans in linear transactions, the U.S. and U.K. courts inappro-
priately allow commercial goals to eclipse revenue aims by focusing on
taxpayer intention, evaluation of business purpose, and consideration of
the appropriate interpretation of the applicable statute. The following
critique of U.S. and U.K. substance over form analysis concludes that
the courts should not give weight to taxpayer intentions, that the courts
should scrutinize transactions even if they are motivated by a business
purpose, and that the courts should determine the fundamental relation-
ship between overriding tax law principles and taxpayer arrangements.
A. Taxpayer Intention and Control
1. Taxpayer Intention
In reaching a conclusion regarding the applicability of the step
transaction doctrine, U.S. and U.K. courts have been influenced by the
intention of the taxpayer. The courts will ignore one or more intermedi-
ate steps taken by the taxpayer if they determine that the overall result
intended by the taxpayer is inconsistent with those steps. Scrutiny of
taxpayer intention is generally a meaningless function in step transaction
analysis because such intention may not indicate whether the taxpayer
has control over events that merit a tax preference. A more fitting in-
quiry is whether the taxpayer had power to achieve an end that is incon-
sistent with a tax statute.
The current judicial practice of focusing on taxpayer intention is
inappropriate for two reasons. First, there exists a problem in defining
and determining meaningful intention.163 The taxpayer's intention to
163. An additional problem involves the question of whose intention is relevant. Professor
Tiley noted this problem as follows:
[The end result test] is also somewhat elusive since it gets caught up with two other
lines of thought. One of these lines is that the parties cannot make a provision of the
tax code apply or not apply simply as a matter of their own volition; the other is that
a given intended tax result is to have the same tax effect whether achieved directly or
by circuitous steps; Thus the court focuses on the result which the parties sought
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minimize taxes is never pertinent.1" However, the presence of a second
variety of intention, taxpayer intention that "contradicts the apparent
transaction," has been found significant. 65 This type of intention is sy-
nonymous with intention to engage in a transaction that achieves a result
inconsistent with the pertinent statutory provision. 66 Neither type of
intention offers any helpful information regarding the fundamental ques-
tion of whether a transaction undertaken by a taxpayer qualifies for tax
savings benefits provided by a statute. That question may be answered
only by reference to legislative intent.
Step transaction analysis is not furthered by consideration of tax-
payer intention. Courts have accepted the usefulness of such intention
under the guise of employing it as a taxpayer protection. 67 Instead of
operating as a protection, reference to taxpayer intention is often used in
a misguided attempt to punish a taxpayer for "bad intention."',6 Under
when they began their transactions. This test necessarily focuses on the parties' in-
tentions and leaves it open as to exactly who are to be treated as the parties.
Tiley, U.S. Alternatives, Part II, supra note 1, at 236 (footnotes omitted).
See also Randolph F. Paul & Philip Zimet, Step Transactions, in Selected STUDIES IN
FEDERAL TAXATION 200, 225 (Randolph E. Paul & Philip Zimet eds., 1938X"The intention
test may import fiction and unreality into the solution of the problem; moreover, if the test is
intention, the intention must be determined, as it frequently must be in the law.", (Footnotes
omitted.)).
164. Esmark Inc. v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 171 (1988), aff'd 486 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir.1989).
165. A.P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383, 390 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (determin-
ing the place of a sale for purposes of geographical sourcing under international taxation
rules). The court noted:
It is undeniable that this [doctrine that a taxpayer may arrange her affairs to mini-
mize taxes is] essential to industry and commerce in a society like our own in which
as far as possible business is always shaped to the form best suited to keep down
taxes. The question always is whether the transaction under scrutiny is in fact what
it appears to be in form. A corporate reorganization may be illusory; a contract of
sale may be intended only to deceive others. In such cases the transaction as a whole
is different from its appearance. It is the intent that controls, but the intent which
counts is one which contradicts the apparent transaction, not the intent to escape
taxation.
Id (citations omitted).
166. This idea was expressed in Craven v. White, [1988] 3 All E.R. 495, 517-18 (H.L).
167. See Randolph E. Paul, Motive and Intent in Federal Tax Law, in STUDIES IN FEa-
ERAL TAXATION 255 (1937).
168. Courts suggest that they are not punishing taxpayers for tax avoidance intention.
However, in their quest to uncover taxpayer intention, the courts look for reasons to deny tax
benefits. Thus, scrutiny of taxpayer intention is used to justify the punishment that results
from treating purportedly separate transactions as one integrated whole. Resort to intention
does not protect taxpayers. In reality the search for taxpayer intention is the embodiment of a
scienter component in step transaction analysis. See e.g., PAUL & ZIMET, supra note 163, at
230-31.
("While lip service is usually paid to the doctrine that a man is none the less well off
because he is trying to avoid tax if the means he adopts are legal, and while there are
1992]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the proposal discussed in Section IV below, a search for intention as a
protective device is unnecessary because inquiry into the existence of tax-
payer control serves as a substitute safeguard for taxpayers.
Focus upon taxpayer intention also restricts rigorous analysis. This
happens because courts are reluctant to view a business deal differently
than intended by the taxpayer. 16 9 Thus, reconstruction of a business
deal, which frequently must occur in evaluating linear transactions, is
rejected as beyond the purview of step transaction doctrine analysis. For
example, Lord Oliver in White found that a critical question involved
determination of the circumstances in which a transaction with "perma-
nent legal and fiscal results" could be ignored and in which "so radical a
reconstruction of the actual events as that undertaken in Dawson [the
first case in the House of Lords to apply anti-avoidance doctrine to a
linear transaction] is permissible... and whether... such a reconstitu-
tion is rationally and logically possible." 10 Lord Oliver resisted deter-
mining tax consequences on the basis of a result not intended by the
taxpayer:
The Ramsay principle [applying anti-avoidance theory to defeat circu-
lar transactions] is simply that you look at the result which the parties
actually intended to and did produce and apply it to the ordinary fiscal
consequences which flow from that result. Dawson involved going a
considerable step further than this and, by reconstituting the actual
constituent transactions into something they were not in fact, attribut-
ing to the parties an intended result which they did not in fact intend.
To that unintended result there are then attached the fiscal conse-
quences that would have flowed if the transaction had actually taken
the form into which it is deemed to be reconstituted. 1
7 1
Lord Oliver expresses the court's reluctance to reconstruct a "real"
transaction when the reconstruction counters the intention of the tax-
payer. 72 This approach is unsatisfactory because it allows a court's
decisions acknowledging success to tax avoiders which go a long way in the direction
of respecting form, the pressure of a constraint to prevent a detriment to the public
revenues is powerful with the courts... There is a strong tendency to look to the
'substance' if the form adopted avoids tax.").
Id
169. See, e.g., Litton Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1086 (1987).
170. Craven v. White, [1988] 3 All E.R. 495 (H.L.).
171. Id
172. Id. Lord Oliver noted:
My Lords, I confess to having been a less than enthusiastic convert to Dawson be-
cause I found, initially at any rate, some difficulty in following the intellectual pro-
cess by which, in contradistinction to the cases which preceded it, it reconstructed
the transaction which had taken place in that case in a way which disapplied the
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analysis to be confined by the intention of the taxpayer.
The U.S. Tax Court in Esmark took an approach similar to that
employed by Lord Oliver. The court in Esmark rejected the Govern-
ment's attempt to interpret two steps consisting of a tender offer and
redemption as a sale of stock by Esmark. The court rejected the recon-
struction because it found that the Government invented new steps. In-
stead, the court focused upon the intention of the taxpayer as
demonstrated by the form chosen. By concluding that the Government's
reconstruction of the transaction was a fiction, the court failed to con-
sider a substance over form approach. To avoid this type of problem,
reference to taxpayer intention should be rejected.
2. Control
As discussed above, scrutiny of taxpayer intention is a meaningless
part of substance over form analysis. Instead, courts should analyze tax-
payer control because this addresses the ultimate question of whether a
taxpayer's technical compliance with a tax statute should be overridden
by tax principles deemed to be more important. If the taxpayer controls
a result that is not sanctioned by a tax statute, a court should apply sub-
stance over form principles to deny the tax preference sought.
The type of intrinsic control that justifies a substance over form ap-
proach in a circular arrangement should also support such an approach
in a linear arrangement. When courts fail to take similar approaches in
circular and linear arrangements, they are influenced by a desire not to
impede the commercial dealings that are a part of the linear transaction.
Because there is no natural precedence of the goal of consummation of
business deals over the obligation of a court to create doctrine, circular
and linear transactions should be treated similarly.
In determining the applicability of the step transaction doctrine, the
courts have implicitly examined a taxpayer's ability to achieve a result
not sanctioned by a tax preference statute, while they have explicitly
scrutinized the taxpayer's intention. The existence of control over a tax-
reduction end that is inconsistent with a statute justifies a court's willing-
ness to determine that mere technical compliance with statutory terms
does not merit the tax benefit sought. Courts find taxpayer control in
circular arrangements because tax reduction is the transaction's only
goal. Control over the tax-avoidance end is an intrinsic part of the circu-
specific statutory consequences which ... attached to the intermediate transrer which
had in fact taken place and which the Special Commissioners had found as a fact was
a genuine transaction.
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lar deal. In linear arrangements, however, courts require that indicia of
control exist in addition to the deal. These indicia, called "extrinsic indi-
cia," include a binding contract, a commitment, or interdependent steps.
The difference in approaches derives from a fundamental difference
in the nature of the relationship between the courts and the transactions.
In the case of a circular transaction, a court need only ignore steps that
accomplish nothing of consequence other than tax reduction. An exam-
ple is when a taxpayer undertakes a transaction generating a gain not
subject to tax which inevitably is mirrored by a loss that reduces tax. In
the case of a linear transaction, by contrast, a taxpayer has taken steps
that achieve a goal other than tax avoidance. For example, a taxpayer
has completed a disposal of shares, a disposal of part of the business, or a
restructuring of a business. The court must then recharacterize those
steps in order to prevent the taxpayer from accomplishing a result not
within the purview of the statute.
In Ramsay, taxpayer control was implied from the nature of the
transaction. Because the two transactions considered in Ramsay in-
volved pure circular schemes, the court easily determined that the tax-
payer intended only to avoid tax liability. The court assumed that the
taxpayer had the ability to achieve the objective even though, in the case
of one of the transactions, 173 the taxpayer had no obligation to carry the
scheme to completion. Because the parties intended no consequence
other than tax avoidance, the court held that there was no possibility that
the steps, once begun, would not be completed.
Dawson followed Ramsay's focus on the taxpayer's intention and
ability to accomplish a tax-avoidance end. 174 According to the Dawson
court, the taxpayers' tax avoidance objective was implied by the nature of
the arrangement for the disposal of the shares. The decision to transfer
the shares evidenced the taxpayers' intention to avoid capital gains tax
and the accomplishment of the arrangement evidenced taxpayer
control. 175
173. W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1981] 1 All E.R. 865 (H.L.). In one
of the matters considered in Ramsay, the promoter was under no contractual obligation to
carry through the scheme, but there was a "clear understanding that the whole scheme would
be carried through." Id. at 881.
174. Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E.R. 530 (H.L.).
175. Id. Lord Brightman professed his rationale to be:
In a preplanned tax saving scheme, no distinction is to be drawn for fiscal purposes,
because none exists in reality, between (i) a series of steps which are followed through
by virtue of an arrangement which falls short of a binding contract, and (ii) a like
series of steps which are followed through because the participants are contractually
bound to take each step seriatim ... For example, in the instant case tax will, on the
Ramsay principle, . . be assessed on the basis that there was a tripartite contract
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However, taxpayer control is arguably not a fundamental aspect of a
linear transaction. Therefore, indicia of control other than the mere
completion of the steps of the transaction must be present in a linear
transaction. One proponent of this view, Lord Oliver, required that a
substantial degree of "certainty and control over the end result at the
time when the intermediate steps are taken" be proved before applying
step transaction doctrine.17 6 In his view, the requisite degree of control
is achieved only when a taxpayer has either a binding obligation or con-
tractual commitment to proceed to the end of a transaction, or when the
intermediate step is dependent on the subsequent steps. 77
Lord Oliver applied his requirement of control as a prerequisite to
application of the step transaction doctrine to a linear transaction in
White. Although the House of Lords had extended the Ramsay ap-
proach to a linear transaction in Dawson, Lord Oliver concluded that the
Dawson principles did not apply to the linear transactions presented in
White because preordination, 78 one of the Dawson criteria,179 was miss-
between the Dawsons, Greenjacket and Wood Bastow under which the Dawsons
contracted to transfer their shares in the operating companies to Greenjacket in re-
turn for an allotment of shares in Greenjacket, and under which Greenjacket simul-
taneously contracted to transfer the same shares to Wood Bastow for a sum in cash.
Under such a tripartite contract the Dawsons would clearly have disposed of the
shares in the operating companies in favour of Wood Bastow in consideration of a
sum of money paid by Wood Bastow with the concurrence of the Dawsons to Green-
jacket. Tax would be assessed, and the base value of the Greenjacket shares calcu-
lated, accordingly. Ramsay says that this fiscal result cannot be avoided because the
preordained series of steps are to be found in an informal arrangement instead of in a
binding contract.
Id at 542-43.
176. Craven v. White, [1988] 3 All P.R. 495, 528 (H.L.). While "absolute certainty in the
sense that every single term of the transaction which ultimately takes place must then be fi-
nally be settled and agreed" is not necessary, according to Lord Oliver, it is "essential at least
that the principal terms should be agreed to the point at which it can be said that there is no
practical likelihood that the transaction which actually takes place will not take place." Id.
177. Id at 527. Lord Oliver contended that:
There is a real and not merely a metaphysical distinction between something that is
done as a preparatory step towards a possible but uncertain contemplated future
action and something which is done as an integral and interdependent part of a trans-
action already agreed and, effectively, predestined to take place.
Id
178. Id at 528. The term "preordination" means that one could predicate with certainty
the ultimate destination of the property, the terms of a transfer or whether a transfer would
take place. Id.
179. Id at 527. Lord Oliver found in Dawson four essential prerequisites to a substance
over form approach. They are: a series of transactions is preordained to give a certain result at
the time of the intermediate transaction, the intermediate transaction has only a tax mitigation
purpose, the intermediate transaction is not contemplated to have an independent life because
there is no practical likelihood that the planned events will not take place, and the preordained
19921
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
ing. According to Lord Oliver, the Dawson extension of step transaction
doctrine to linear deals does not concern transactions like those in White
because the element of taxpayer control, expressed in the term "preordi-
nation," is absent.18
However, Ramsay furnishes little support for Lord Oliver's analysis
of a linear transaction. In Ramsay, the court suggested that taxpayer
control may be demonstrated in the mere carrying through of a linear
transaction.""1 To support this proposition, the court cited the dissenting
events in fact take place. Id. According to Lord Oliver, the abserce of at least one of the
Dawson criteria raised the following three questions:
First, are those criteria definitive as they appear to have been intended by Lord
Brightman to be or are they capable of expansion so as to embrace all or any of the
transactions here in question either because they merely exemplify some wider prin-
ciple or because it may be thought politic that they should be so expanded? Second,
ought they to be expanded by your Lordships as a matter ofjudicial intervention into
an area in which Parliament is demonstrably capable of legislating effectively but has
not sought to do so? Third, and if the answer to the second question is affirmative,
what formula or principle ate your Lordships to evolve which will be at once certain,
effective and easy to apply and on what legal foundation is su-h a principle to be
based?
Id. at 516,
Another "salient feature" in Dawson that Oliver found to be missing in White was con-
temporaneity of steps taken. Id. at 515.
180. Id. at 516. Lord Oliver suggested that the House of Lords maintained two conflicting
views about the meaning of Dawson. One view held that Dawson meant that "any transaction
having as its purpose, or as one of its purposes, the avoidance, minimisation or postponement
of a liability to tax on another transaction of a kind which was then in contemplation and
which subsequently takes place is to be ignored for fiscal purposes because it has been planned
to take place and therefore forms part of a 'scheme for the avoidance of tax'." Id. at 516.
Under this view, according to Lord Oliver, it is sufficient if the intermediate step is undertaken
with the mere contemplation or anticipation of a final step. Id. This enunciation of Lord
Templeman's view distorts. Lord Templeman found that four essential conditions supported a
substance over form approach:
First, the taxpayer must decide to carry out, if he can, a scheme to avoid an assess-
ment of tax on an intended taxable transaction by combining it with a prior tax
avoidance transaction. Second, the tax avoidance transaction must have no business
purpose apart from the avoidance of tax on the intended taxable transaction. Third,
after the tax avoidance transaction has taken place, the taxpayer must retain power
to carry out his part of the intended taxable transaction. Fourth, the intended taxa-
ble transaction must in fact take place.
Id. at 510.
See Lord Oliver's list of essentials discussed infra note 179. Contrary to Lord Oliver's
assertion, Lord Templeman argued that a substance over form approach was warranted be-
cause after the transfer of shares to the intermediary the taxpayers "retained power to carry
out their part of the intended sale because they had power through [their ownership of the
intermediary] to ensure.., the sale [of the transferred shares to the third party]." Craven v.
White, [1988] 3 All E.R. 495, 510 (H.L.).
Under Lord Oliver's view, Dawson simply applied a substance over form analysis to linear
transactions. Id. at 517-18.
181. W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioner [1981] 1 All E.R. 865, 871. As
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opinion in Moor. The dissenter in Floor applied the step transaction doc-
trine because he believed that taxpayer control was an intrinsic part of
the arrangement despite the absence of a contract-like obligation to pro-
ceed with the ultimate disposition.
In McDonald's, the Seventh Circuit followed the Ramsay approach
and found that taxpayer control in a linear transaction may be evidenced
by intrinsic elements of a tax avoidance arrangement as well as by extrin-
sic indicia, such as a contractual obligation, a binding commitment, or
interdependence of steps. Like Ramsay, Dawson, and the dissent in
Foor, the ability of the taxpayer in McDonald's to achieve the intended
result was inherent in the arrangement of the parties. Given the under-
standing with the shareholders of the acquired companies, McDonald's
controlled the destiny of the unregistered shares throughout the
transaction.1
82
In Esmark, the court rejected the approach taken by the Seventh
Circuit in McDonald's and required extrinsic evidence of taxpayer con-
trol as a prerequisite to the application of the step transaction doctrine.
In that case, the Service argued that the court should ignore the step
consisting of Mobil's purchase of Esmark stock pursuant to a tender offer
because this step was a mere device to effect the tax-free sale by Esmark
of the subsidiary stock, which would avoid a taxable outright sale. The
Tax Court found that Esmark lacked an ability to effect a tax-avoidance
plan because it did not and could not control the shareholder sales of
stock to Mobil. The court stated that "[Esmark], a publicly held com-
pany, could in no way bind its shareholders to an agreement to sell their
shares. Each shareholder independently decided to sell or retain Esmark
stock. [Esmark] was also under no direct or indirect obligation to
noted above, Ramsay involved a circular arrangement and thus any reference made by the
court in that case to linear transactions may be labelled mere dictum. On the other hand, it
may be argued that the court's express reference to a linear transaction, in its citation to the
F/oor case, indicates that it felt that its reasoning was equally applicable to both types of
transactions.
182. See Floor v. Davis, [1978] 2 All ERL 1079, 1089. A corollary to the question whether
the intention of the parent McDonald's or of the selling group is pertinent in a substance over
form analysis of the McDonald's transaction, discussed supra note 72, is the question whether
control by the parent-purchaser or by the sellers is significant. Under the proposal in section
IV, infra text accompanying notes 227-246, it is significant that the taxpayer, McDonald's,
possessed the ability to achieve the result. However, the ability of all parties acting in concert
with McDonald's - namely, the Garb-Stem group - would also be essential to a determination
of control. For example, the group was willing to enter into the transaction only with provi-
sions guaranteeing early saleability of the stock received in the merger and it planned to sell
the stock despite a low market price. Coupled with the parent's desire to eliminate the Garb-
Stern group and the parent's willingness to ensure easy transferability of the stock, the circum-
stances demonstrate the ability of McDonald's to achieve the desired end.
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purchase its public shareholders' stock." '83 Consequently, the court
would not recharacterize the transaction as a taxable disposition of the
stock of the subsidiary to Mobil with the sales proceeds being paid by
Mobil to the tendering Esmark shareholders. 84
The insistence of the White majority and the Esmark court upon
extrinsic evidence of taxpayer control as a prerequisite to the application
of the step transaction doctrine amounts to a refusal to apply the same
analysis employed in examining circular transactions to linear transac-
tions. Instead, in accordance with the approaches of Lord Templeman, a
dissenter in White, and the Seventh Circuit in McDonald's, control that is
an intrinsic part of a transaction, as demonstrated by the consummation
of business steps, should support application of substance over form anal-
ysis in linear arrangements.
The type of intrinsic control that justifies a substance over form ap-
proach in the circular arrangement should suffice in a linear arrangement
because in both cases a court must determine whether a taxpayer's tech-
nical compliance with a provision should result in the tax benefits sought.
The commercial nature of a transaction should not affect the obligation
of a court to balance appropriately the interests of the parties. Under the
proposal in Section IV to consider taxpayer control instead of intention,
the taxpayer's interest is protected by the requirement that substance
over form not be applied unless the taxpayer's actions achieve tax reduc-
tions not sanctioned by the statute. The government's interest is pro-
tected by the court's recognition that the term "control" includes control
reflected by the simple execution of the steps in a business transaction.
B. Business Purpose
The existence of a legitimate business purpose plays an important
role in step transaction analysis. A business objective, other than tax
minimization, is not a feature of the circular transaction. Consequently,
a court may more readily take a substance over form approach. On the
other hand, in linear transactions designed to accomplish commercial
goals, the presence of legitimate business ends may weigh against the
application of the doctrine in order to avoid interference in the business
arena.
In the case of linear transactions, the U.S. and U.K. courts generally
hold that the presence of a business aim does not preclude the application
of step transaction analysis. The U.K. courts, however, have flatly re-




fused to employ step transaction analysis where the intermediate tax-sav-
ings step is motivated by a business purpose other than tax avoidance.
The U.S. courts have also been reluctant to employ the step transaction
doctrine where an arrangement is motivated by legitimate business con-
cers. Often without consideration of tax policy mandates, they treat the
revenue goals embodied in legislative enactments as less important than
the aims of the business community. Further, they have failed to require
a business objective for each step of an arrangement. If the U.S. courts
adopt the approach found in Esmark, they will conclude that a substance
over form approach should rarely be applied to legitimate business deals.
As discussed below, a significant question exists regarding the
weight to be accorded a "business purpose" in step transaction analysis.
Admittedly, taxation statutes governing business transactions are in-
tended to apply to transactions that have consequences 8 5 which are
commercial or financial in nature. When a taxpayer attempts to fit an
arrangement lacking real consequences under the rubric of a tax statute
relating to real business transactions, the attempted maneuver should be
scrutinized and rebuffed."8 6 When an arrangement with real conse-
quences exhibits a business purpose, it should also be examined in order
to determine whether the desired tax advantages should be allowed. Tax
benefits should not be accorded to a transaction which the statute did not
intend to cover merely because the transaction has a business purpose.
The U.K. courts eschew the idea that a step taken by a taxpayer for
a business reason is subject to judicial scrutiny. In White, the court
noted that one "critical feature" of the operation of the step transaction
doctrine in the case of linear transactions is that the intermediate step
"serves no purpose other than that of saving tax."187 Consequently, if a
business purpose motivates a tax-avoidance step, the overall arrangement
will be free of scrutiny. '
While the U.K. courts will not examine a step motivated by a busi-
185. See Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1970) and
Millett, Artificial Avoidance, supra note 20, at 331.
186. Waterman, 430 F.2d at 1193.
187. Craven v. White, [1988] 3 All E.RL 495, 528 (H.L.).
188. This conclusion is unassailable since the White court did not refuse to apply the step
transaction doctrine on that ground. The lack of a business purpose in the intermediate steps
taken in the three matters presented in White was presumed by the court. There was little
discussion of this aspect of the case, however, because the court resolved the case by reference
to the issue of taxpayer ability to achieve the final step or end result of the transaction. See
infra text accompanying notes 137-38. Professor Tiley takes a different view, suggesting that
Lord Oliver found a "bona fide commercial purpose" behind the transfer of shares in the
Queensferry transaction because of the possibility of the merger. John Tiley, Note of Case,
1989 BRrr. TAX REv. 20, 24-25.
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ness objective, they will not preclude scrutiny of an arrangement merely
because the overall goal of a transaction includes "the achievement of a
legitimate commercial (i.e. business) [sic] end." 189 In contrast, a U.S.
court in TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States,190 felt bound to view a
transaction from the standpoint of the overall business purpose. TSN
involved the distribution of assets to the controlling corporate sharehold-
ers and other shareholders of a life insurance company. 191 The corporate
shareholder deducted from income eighty-five percent of the amount of
the distribution as a dividend received.' 92 About a week later, the share-
holders sold nearly all of the insurance company's stock to another insur-
ance company, Union Mutual. The purchaser then made a contribution
to the acquired company nearly equal to the value of assets previously
distributed as a dividend. If the price for the stock had been increased, in
lieu of the presale distribution, the shareholder would have been required
to include the full amount in income. Because the overall goal of the
transaction was to rid the corporation of assets not wanted by the pur-
chaser of the stock, the Court of Appeals refused to focus on the corpora-
tion's lack of business purpose for payment of the dividend or any tax
avoidance motive of the controlling corporate shareholder. 193 The court
found that the business purpose for the entire transaction controls:
[I]t seems to us to be inconsistent to take the position that substance
must control over form and that a transaction must be viewed as a
whole, rather than in parts, and at the same time to state that the [lack
of] business purpose of one participant in a multi-party transaction...
is to be viewed in isolation from the over-all business purpose for the
entire transaction.
194
Consequently, the purchaser's unwillingness to buy the stock of a corpo-
ration possessing the distributed assets served to justify the presale divi-
dend, and the presence of this business purpose precluded application of
the step transaction doctrine. 195
189. Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E.R. 530, 543 (H.L.); see also White, 3 All E.R. at
509.
190. TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1332, 1336 (5th Cir. 1980).
191. Id. at 1329.
192. See I.R.C. § 243. With the 1986 Tax Reform Act and th: 1987 Revenue Act, the
amount of the deduction was reduced to 80% or 70%. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 611(a)(l), 100
Stat. 2249 (1986); Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10221(a)(1), 101 Stat. 1330-408 (1987).
193. TSN Liquidating Corp., 624 F.2d at 1336. The Court of Appeals noted that the Dis-
trict Court made "no suggestion" of a tax avoidance motive on the part of TSN. Id. It found
it insignificant that the payment of the dividend may have had incidental tax benefit. Id
194. Id.
195. Id. Compare TSN with Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185 (5th
Cir. 1970)(finding that a corporate distribution prior to a sale of the distributor's stock was in
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While the TSN court's complete reliance upon the existence of a
business purpose is not sound, the court's conclusion that a substance
over form approach would not require recharacterization of the dividend
as part of the sale proceeds may be the same conclusion reached under
this Article's proposal discussed below in Section IV. The proposal ad-
vocates a determination of whether a substance over form approach
should be taken and requires consideration of statutory intent, consis-
tency of the result achieved with that intent, and taxpayer control over
that result. Where statutory intent demands protection of the taxpayer's
legitimate interest in the accomplishment of business transactions, the
existence of a strong business need for the particular transactional struc-
ture chosen, referred to as business exigency, may preclude the applica-
tion of the step transaction doctrine. Given the strong insurance business
need of the purchaser of the TSN stock to eliminate unwanted TSN as-
sets before the acquisition, the result in TSN is the same as the outcome
reached under the proposal.
Considering the recent decision in Esmark, U.S. courts may be mov-
ing toward a rejection of a substance over form approach when a transac-
tion has a business purpose. The U.S. Tax Court in Esmark implied that
the step transaction doctrine may not be applied in a linear transaction
with business goals.196 In Esmark, the court found that the doctrine acts
only to combine " 'a series of individually meaningless "steps" into a sin-
gle transaction.' """9 There the taxpayer had taken no meaningless steps
because each step accomplished the two business objectives of disposing
of the subsidiary and redeeming a substantial portion of Esmark's
stock. 198 In Esmark, the Tax Court abdicated the role of arbiter and
allowed the business objectives of the taxpayer to govern. By allowing the
reality part of the proceeds of the stock sale where the purchaser of the stock loaned the funds
enabling payment of the note distributed to the shareholders). See Diane McCarron, Note,
The Obsolescence of the Waterman Steamship Doctrine, 24 NEw ENO. L REv. 653 (1989).
After the enactment of I.R.C. § 1059 (requiring an adjustment to the basis of stock held by
certain corporate shareholders that receive an extraordinary dividend), the transactions de-
scribed in 7SN and Waterman Steamship may no longer offer the same tax advantages.
196. Esmark v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171 (1988) affid 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989). A
similar approach was taken in Litton Industries v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1086 (1987). How-
ever, in a recent case decided after Esmark, Associated Wholesale Grocers v. United States,
927 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1991), the court rejected the taxpayers contention that the existence
of a business purpose precluded step transaction analysis.
197. Esmark, 90 T.C. at 195 (quoting Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428 (1987)).
198. Id. at 195-96. According to the court, the two objectives could only be accomplished
in two steps. Id. at 196. Implying that to do otherwise would require it to exceed the province
of its judicial function, the court would not fault the taxpayer for taking the two steps resulting
in the lowest tax liability. Id The approach expressed in Esmark is similar of the British
standard in White, which provides that a court will ignore an intermediate step taken by the
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business purpose to preclude the application of step -transaction analysis,
the court in Esmark took a more rigid approach to step transaction
analysis.
While a lack of business purpose in a circular arrangement may sup-
port a conclusion that tax benefits are not available, 99 the existence of a
business purpose should not determine that such benefits are available in
a linear arrangement. The presence of a business purpose, while relevant
to a consideration of whether a substance over form approach should be
taken, should not immunize a linear arrangement. The approaches taken
in the U.S. and U.K. cases described above reflect a view noted by Pro-
fessor Tiley of Cambridge University:
[A] different view is that where the parties have a bona fide business
purpose in seeking to take advantage of an option the tax system gives
them they should be allowed to arrange their affairs so as to bring them
within the terms of those provisions without the risk of the doctrine
being applied.2 "°
This view fails to consider the interest of the taxing authority in the effec-
tive operation of tax laws. The view should be rejected in favor of an
approach that regards the existence of a business purpose along with
other more important factors, such as taxpayer control over events in-
consistent with the pertinent statute, in determining whether to honor
the form of an arrangement chosen by the taxpayer.
C. Statutory Interpretation
In general, the step transaction doctrine is invoked when a court
concludes that the taxpayer intended to effect an arrangement not con-
templated by a statute affording tax savings. In a circular arrangement,
the U.S. and U.K. courts approve of intervention by the judiciary to de-
termine the purpose of a tax statute in relation to steps taken by a tax-
payer.201 In the case of linear arrangements, however, courts of both
taxpayer only if the step serves no business purpose other than saving tax. Craven v. White,
[1988] 3 All E.R. 495, 526-27(H.L.).
199. The existence of a business purpose was considered by the court in Gregory, a circular
case, in its determination whether the transaction engaged in accorded with the tax preference
statute. According to the court, a tax-free reorganization did not include a transaction under-
taken for no business purpose. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1934). As a re-
sult, the transaction in question did not constitute a tax-free reorganization because no
business purpose motivated it. Id. at 469.
200. Tiley, U.S. Alternatives, Part II, supra note 1, at 239.
201. W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1989] 1 All E.R. 865, 873 (H.L.); see
also Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 1 All E.R. 530, 533 (H.L.). The U.S. Supreme Court would
not attribute to Congress an intention to allow interest deductions of the type claimed by the
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nations are generally less willing to intervene. In linear transactions, the
issue arises whether a court has the authority to ignore legitimate steps
taken by taxpayers and to apply step transaction doctrine. 02 In applying
the step transaction doctrine, the court must avoid the appearance that it
is fulfilling a legislative function. 203
The "judge-made" doctrine of step transaction analysis2° is not a
product of judicial legislation because the doctrine is based upon princi-
ples of statutory construction. 205 In a circular arrangement, a court may
ignore steps taken by the taxpayer and simply conclude that nothing
within the purview of a tax savings statute has occurred. In the linear
arrangement, a court must acknowledge that something happened and it
must somehow square the occurrence, which is most likely authorized by
the terms of other non-tax statutes, with a tax savings statute. Courts are
reluctant in the linear situation to recharacterize real events because it
may be difficult to discern whether a statute that appears to apply on a
literal reading does not apply in reality. Lord Oliver acknowledged this
difficulty in White: "[A judicial decision may contradict a statute only
when] as a matter of construction of the statute, the court has ascertained
that that which has taken place is not, within the meaning of the statute,
the transaction to which those consequences attach....",0"
Reluctance to recharacterize real events, however, should not ham-
string the application of step transaction theory because courts are obli-
gated to determine whether a transaction that technically meets the
terms of a statute garners the desired tax benefits. After determining the
literal meaning of statutory terms, a court must decide the applicability
of a substance over form approach. Resort to legislative history to deter-
mine the underlying purposes of the statute0 7 and analysis of the tax-
taxpayer where "nothing of substance [was] to be realized by [the taxpayer] from [the] transac-
tion beyond a tax deduction." Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960).
202. Tiley, U.S: Alternatives, supra note 11, at 195.
203. Craven v. White, [1988] 3 All E.R. 495, 528 (ILL) There is unanimity concerning
the idea that a court should not legislate. For example, Lord Oliver noted in White:
What the Crown urges on your Lordships is a restatement of the [Ramsay] approach
in a formula based... on... [the] general principle of judicial disapprobation of the
lawful arrangement of the subject's affairs designed to produce a result which is fis-
cally advantageous to him in relation to a transaction into which he anticipates enter-
ing. That is essentially a legislative exercise and one on which, in my opinion, your
Lordships should hesitate long before embarking.
IdL
204. Craven v. White, [1988] 3 All ER. 495, 517 (H.L.); McDonald's of Zion v. Commis-
sioner, 76 T.C. 972, 995 (1981).
205. White, [1988] 3 All E.R. at 524.
206. Ia at 517-18.
207. This is an example of the "legal process" approach to statutory interpretation which
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payer's control over, or connection to, the end achieved must support the
decision. If the result controlled by the taxpayer creates an inconsistency
with the statute, a court should apply a substance over form approach to
conclude that tax benefits are not available. On the other hand, if the
transaction achieves a result consistent with the statute, the taxpayer
should obtain the desired benefits.20 8
The U.S. and U.K. courts have not recognized that application of
the substance over form doctrine involves more than application of a
statute to a set of facts. Both courts fail to realize that application of the
doctrine also requires enunciation of principles governing the relation-
ship of tax laws to tax reduction transactions devised in the business
world.2' This approach is illustrated in Associated Wholesale Grocers v.
maintains that "unless statutory language clearly answers the interpretive question, the pre-
ferred interpretation is that which best advances the basic 'purpose' of the statute." See WIL-
LIAM ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 571 (1988) and, Walter J. Blum, The
Importance of Form in the Taxation of Corporate Transactions, 54 TAXES 613, 614 (1976). For
a discussion of some of the special problems of interpretation of tax statutes see Michael Liv-
ingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax
Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991), and Bradford Ferguson et. al,, Reexamining the Nature
and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of the Process, 67 TAXES
804 (1989).
208. See, eg., Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794, 793-99 (4th Cir. 1966)(The
court read literally the term "immediately after the distribution" for purposes of I.R.C. § 355
on the ground that a substance over form approach would be inconsistent with the legislative
history of the provision.) and Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670, 676-77 (1st
Cir. 1956)(The "elective features" reflected in the legislative history of I.R.C. § 332 led the
court to respect the form chosen by the taxpayer.).
209. Courts seem unwilling to accept this role of the substance over form doctrine. For
example, the Cumberland Public Service court suggested that the question whether substance
over form controls is a factual one. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv., 338 U.S. 451,
453-54 (1950). It is not clear whether the Supreme Court intended to hold that the question
whether substance or form controls, which subsumes the determination of who actually made
a sale, is a factual one or whether its statements simply related to the standard of review to be
accorded findings at the trial level. Whatever its intention, it is apparent that the Supreme
Court in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1934), announced a rule of law that could not be
undermined by findings, similar to those made by the Tax Court in Gregory, that a taxpayer,
having complied with the technical requirements of a tax statute, is entitled to benefits ac-
corded by the statute without regard to the substance of the transaction. Gregory, 27 B.T.A.
223, 225 (1932). Instead, Gregory announced a general principle of tax law that governs the
manner in which a court views steps taken by taxpayers. Since Cumberland Public Service,
the Supreme Court has held that "[tjhe general characterization of a transaction for tax pur-
poses is a question of law subject to review." Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561,
581 n.16 (1978). That holding supports this Article's view of the substance over form doctrine
as a general tax law principle. Because of misconceptions regarding the role of the doctrine,
the Courts of Appeal have not accepted that standard. See, e.g., Rexnord, Inc. v. United
States, 940 F.2d 1094, 1096-97 (7th Cir. 1991).
Similar misconceptions exist in the U.K. In Dawson, Lord Brightman suggested that fac-
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United States,21° which involved a purported sale of the assets of Super
Market Developer's majority-owned subsidiary, Weston, in order to rec-
ognize losses resulting from a decrease in the market value of Weston's
assets. In the transaction, Weston merged into a new corporation
formed by an individual, Elder, who wanted to acquire the stock of Wes-
ton Market, one of Weston's assets. Super Market and the subsidiary's
minority shareholders received cash and a noninterest-bearing promis-
sory note in exchange for their stock. Super Market claimed a loss equal
to the difference between its portion of the cash and promissory note
received and its adjusted basis in its Weston stock.
Immediately after the merger, Super Market bought back all of the
assets of Weston, except the Weston Market stock, for an amount equal
to the note plus the cash received by the minority shareholders. The
Service claimed that no loss could be recognized under Internal Revenue
Code section 332 because the transaction amounted to a complete liqui-
dation of Weston.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the statute precluded loss recogni-
tion if Super Market owned at least eighty percent of the stock of Weston
at the time of the repurchase of Weston's assets from Elder's corporation.
It then applied the step transaction doctrine to determine whether the
Super Market transaction was "within the reach [of section 332]." 211 It
found interdependence of the merger and repurchase of assets in the par-
ties' formal agreements which provided that those steps be taken. The
merger and repurchase of assets were so closely connected that the agree-
ments failed to list the assets, obligations, and liabilities to be transferred
in the merger. At the end of the transaction when all of the Weston
assets, except the stock purchased by Elder, remained with Super Mar-
ket, only a cash purchase of the Weston Market stock had occurred.
Consequently, under the substance over form doctrine the court ignored
the merger and treated the transaction as a liquidation of the assets of the
subsidiary. The analysis found in Associated Wholesale is the correct ap-
proach to substance over form doctrine because it acknowledges that the
tual findings (the existence of a composite transaction and the insertion of a step lacking an
independent business purpose) support a substance over form approach. Furniss v. Dawson,
[1984] 1 All E.R. 530, 543-44 (H.L.). In White, Lord Oliver found that the approach was
"simply one of the construction of the relevant statute and an analysis of the ... transactions
which are claimed to give rise to the liability or the tax exemption." Craven v. White, [1988] 3
All E.,. 495, 520 (H.L.). This statement ignores the court's role in enunciating a tax law
principle that governs the relationship between tax laws and business transactions.
210. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1991).
211. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. 927 F.2d at 1525. Cf Granite Trust Co. v.
United States, 236 F.2d 670 (lst Cir. 1956).
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court must determine the relationship between the tax laws and the steps
taken by a taxpayer.
D. Commercial Goals Found in Linear Transactions Should Not
Preclude Application of Step Transaction Analysis
As demonstrated above, the more flexible approach to the applica-
tion of substance over form to circular transactions found in Knetsch,
Gregory, Ramsay, and Burmah is not applied in linear arrangements like
Esmark and White. The courts are more willing to ignore the form cho-
sen by the taxpayer when a transaction is not motivated by a business
aim and the sole impetus is tax avoidance. The courts are reluctant to
ignore the form chosen by the taxpayer in a case involving a linear trans-
action because it involves legitimate business purposes. Consequently, in
an effort to accommodate the community's interest in predictable tax
consequences, the courts consider and are unduly swayed by inappropri-
ate factors, such as taxpayer intention and business purpose. These fac-
tors are not fitting indicators that a transaction should or should not be
accorded a preferential tax result. The proposal set forth in the next
section provides an analytical framework that considers appropriate
indicators.
IV. PROPOSED THEORY
The proposed theory is based upon the premise that a court should
apply a substance over form approach in every linear transaction which
achieves a result inconsistent with the legislative intention underlying a
statute and where the result attained is within the taxpayer's control. If a
court cannot discern statutory purpose, it should balance the interests of
the taxpayer and the taxing authority. This approach would involve the
examination of factors that pertain to the propriety of recharacterizing a
business transaction, such as whether the arrangement achieves a defer-
ral of or an escape from taxation, whether each step of the transaction is
motivated by business exigency, taxpayer control over steps taken, speci-
ficity of the statute, and taxpayer intention to avoid taxation.
The proposed theory incorporates the premise that the taxpayer is
not required to maximize taxes. A court may not interfere with a tax-
payer's business deal merely because the deal is structured with tax con-
siderations in mind.212 This limit on the court's power is based upon the
212. The statement is valid so long as the tax statute in question does not provide that the
mere presence of tax avoidance will prevent a taxpayer from obtaining the benefits sought.
See, ag., W.T. Ramsay v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1981] 1 All E.R. 865, 871 (H.L,).
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principle that a court may not legislate.21 3 In tax cases, the function of a
court is to determine whether a transaction is governed by the pertinent
statute. Application of the step transaction doctrine requires the court to
use its power to interpret the applicable tax statutue. However, the as-
sertion of interpretive power often creates a conflict with the admonition
against judicial legislation.
The model proposes to diminish potential conflict by suggesting that
a court apply the step transaction doctrine when it determines that a
transaction has achieved a result not intended by the pertinent statute.
The advantages of the proposal are that it would permit a court to con-
tinue to take a case by case approach needed to permit inquiry into un-
derlying substantive issues and would require the court to determine
legislative intent. The determination of legislative intent, otherwise
known as statutory interpretation, is widely viewed as a legitimate func-
tion of a court.214 On the other hand, the proposal has disadvantages
because it requires inquiry into elusive legislative objectives and advo-
cates a subjective standard for the application of the doctrine. Subjective
standards are disfavored in tax law because they fail to provide taxpayers
a mechanism for evaluating future transactions. 15
213. Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171, 196 (1988).
214. ATiYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 91, at 100-01 ('Of course every judge interpreting
an enactment must usually give some weight to the statutory language, and it is difficult to
believe that there are judges who never look to the underlying substantive purposes of the
legislature. But it is our belief that English judges tend to adopt a more textual, literal ap-
proach, while American courts tend to take a more purposive and, therefore, substantive, ap-
proach." (Italics and footnotes omitted)).
215. Commentators have condemned current step transaction doctrine because it does not
provide certainty regarding the substance of legal concepts and the manner in which they will
be applied. See, e-g., Tiley, Corporations & Conclusions, supra note 5, at 134-35. Uncertainty
is felt to be bad because it creates costs of obtaining tax advice and litigating disputes and
inefficiencies that can result from structuring business deals in order to avoid uncertain areas.
IdL Thus, it causes the system to lack integrity. Id Professor Tiley argues that, under the new
British approach taken after W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, the area of un-
certainty has been reduced: "[T]he old uncertainty - to some at least - of the schemes such
as Ramsay has been removed. What has happened is that the.., area of uncertainty has been
moved and, insofar as the areas now in doubt contain transactions closer to normal business
operations - and so of greater frequency - it is the number of cases that are uncertain rather
than the area of uncertain law which has increased." Tiley, Corporations & Conclusions, supra
note 5, at 135. Tiley concludes that litigation costs will not be great once the courts have
formulated the new approach and the British government has adopted a system of advance
rulings. Id The notion that uncertainty causes a lack of integrity, he observes, is founded
upon the belief that "certainty is a good in its own right." Id Professor Tiley's retort is that
flexibility in tax law concepts will not necessarily undermine the system. See, eg., Tiley, U.S
Alternatives Part II, supra note 1, at 231 (Where "the step transaction doctrine can apply to
alter the tax consequences of steps from those which would apply if each step were taken
separately[,]" such as in the case where a set of facts falls under two rules that provide separate
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The proposed theory would accommodate the interests of the taxing
authority and the taxpayer by forbidding intervention with a business
arrangement in the absence of a result inconsistent with statutory in-
tent.21 6 The proposal's reference to the connection between result
achieved and statutory intent is not an adoption of the end result test
used by U.S. courts to determine whether the step transaction doctrine
will be applied. Under the end result test, "'purportedly separate trans-
actions will be amalgamated with a single transaction when it appears
that they were really component parts of a single transaction intended
from the outset to be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate re-
sult.' "2"7 The end result test differs from the proposal because the test
focuses on the connection between the result achieved and the intention
of the taxpayer. The proposal generally rejects exploration of taxpayer
intention because of the difficulties in ascertaining meaningful intention.
The proposal focuses instead on legislative intention because application
of the step transaction doctrine is fundamentally an exercise in statutory
construction.21 8 In applying the step transaction doctrine, the only legit-
imate function of the court is to interpret and to implement statutory
mandates.
However, the recognition that statutory intention is conceptually a
more rational component of step transaction analysis than a search for
taxpayer intention, does not resolve the difficulties that attend the search
consequences, the application of the doctrine is "logically justifiable only so long as the legal
system tells the taxpayer... when one rule is superior to the other."). According to Professor
Tiley, one rule may precede another when they exist on different planes of reasoning. Id. at
231-32. A general principle of tax law (e.g., a taxpayer is not to be taxed on the basis of what
she might have done) may trump a narrower statutory rule (e.g., a distribution in redemption
of stock that does not significantly reduce a taxpayer's holdings constitutes a dividend which is
ordinary income and not capital gain). Id. For example, the court in Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213
F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954), refused to recharacterize a taxpayer's sale of a portion of her stock
followed by a redemption of the remainder (resulting in lower taxed capital gain) as a redemp-
tion of stock followed by a sale of the balance (resulting in a higher taxed dividend). The
rationale for the decision was that the taxpayer should not be taxed on the basis of what she
might have done. Id. at 917. See Tiley, U.S. Alternatives, Part 11, supra note 1, at 231-32; see
also supra note 158.
216. See Tiley, US. Alternatives, Part II, supra note 1, at 238-39.
217. McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner 76 T.C. 972, 994 (quoting King Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1969)). For a discusmion of the three versions
of the step transaction doctrine in U.S. law, see Tiley, U.S. Alternatives, Part II, supra note 1,
at 235-36.
218. It is important to note that the approaches to statutory construction are different in
the U.S. and U.K. Atiyah and Summers contend that England "relies on legislation more
readily to resolve questions that are in America left to the courts" because England has
"strong centralized political institutions" and the English judiciary "is a relatively weak body
with a very minor political role." ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 91, at 299.
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for statutory meaning. These difficulties arise because a statute may lack
any indication of a legislative intention regarding a particular result. The
absence of indicators may stem from legislative ignorance of modem
business practices, lack of agreement, or a temporary desire not to re-
strain business planning.
Where little or no guidance exists, a court must make a judgment
regarding statutory intention. As guidance decreases, a court becomes
more susceptible to the charge that it is legislating. That charge is an-
swered by the proposal in three ways. First, the proposal suggests that it
is preferable that a court, rather than a taxpayer, determine the conse-
quences of tax provisions in the absence of legislative guidance.219 Sec-
ond, the requirement in the proposal of taxpayer control over the result
provides a check on a court's ability to prescribe a result unintended by
the legislature. Third, the proposal maintains that reference to statutory
intent rather than taxpayer intent forms a more rational conceptual basis
for the application of the step transaction doctrine.
Reference to taxpayer intention is also rejected under the proposal
as unnecessary for taxpayer protection. The proposed alternative evalu-
ates the taxpayer's ability to procure the result achieved. Focus on tax-
payer control over the result is more appropriate because it connects the
end impliedly forbidden by the statute with taxpayer action. A business
deal should be restructured only if actions of the taxpayer achieve the
undesirable end.
The proposal advocates a broad view of the concept of control and
therefore recognizes that the requisite control may be express or im-
plied.' Express control results from contractual or similar binding
agreements that guarantee accomplishment of the taxpayer's goal. The
guarantee arises from the enforceable rights possessed. Implied control
stems from the nature of the transaction in question and may be indi-
cated by the period of time between execution of steps taken, the rela-
tionship of the parties involved, and the interrelationship of the steps
219. A different approach would provide a taxpayer with an election to operate within or
without the tax laws. See Tiley, U.S. Alternatives Part II, supra note 1, at 234 and Tiley,
Corporations & Conclusions, supra note 5, at 136 ("When courts talk about the need to main-
tain the integrity of the tax base they mean that taxpayers should not be free to opt out of the
tax system and that the policy of fair distribution of the tax burden which, whatever it may
precisely mean, lies behind much of the tax system, should not be subverted by allowing tax-
payers to manipulate concepts for purposes the legislature may reasonably be taken not to have
intended.").
220. See discussion in text supra accompanying notes 173-84.
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taken or alternatives not chosen by the taxpayer.221 In some circum-
stances, certain forms of taxpayer intention may evidence implied con-
trol.222 While reference to taxpayer intention is rejected as an
incongruous part of step transaction analysis, it may shed light on a tax-
payer's ability to procure a result.
223
The proposal also requires examination of business exigency which
is one of the elements to be considered in the balancing test used When a
court cannot discern statutory purpose. The existence of a business pur-
pose for taking several steps should not preclude application of the sub-
stance over form principle unless each step is motivated by a business
purpose and each step taken is dictated by business exigencies. The term
business exigency denotes a strong and legitimate business purpose such
as a need to eliminate assets not wanted by a purchaser,224 and does not
include a taxpayer's hope of creating a meaningful transaction. 225 In this
respect, the proposal would address the current reluctance of the U.S.
and U.K. courts to interfere with arrangements reflecting a vestige of a
business purpose.
In the case of linear transactions, emphasis upon the mere existence
of a non-tax avoidance business purpose does not assist analysis because
all linear transactions are aimed at attaining a business goal.226 A tax-
payer's choice of structure should not prevail unless each stage in a series
is meaningful from a business standpoint. Further, the requirement of a
business need for each step in an arrangement accords significant weight
to the governmental interest in avoiding defeat of the taxing statutes.
V. APPLICATION OF PROPOSED THEORY
A. Esmark
The proposed model provides that a court should take a substance
over form approach when a taxpayer attains a result inconsistent with
the legislative intention of a tax preference statute. The step transaction
doctrine should have been applied by the Esmark court to treat the ex-
221. Control was demonstrated in Esmark by the taxpayer's decision not to employ sim-
pler alternatives. 90 T.C. 171.
222. See infra note 223.
223. Intention of this type may include, for example, intention to enter into a transaction in
which steps are mutually dependent.
224. See, e.g., TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1980).
225. See Associated Wholesale Grocers v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1527 (10th Cir.
1991), where the court was skeptical of a claimed business purpose to cash-out minority share-
holders who owned no more than .03 percent of the taxpayer's stock.
226. See discussion of business purpose as an element of a substance over form approach,
supra notes 185-200 and accompanying text.
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change of subsidiary stock for Esmark stock as one taxable sale by Es-
mark of the Subsidiary's stock because the two-step tender offer and
redemption achieved a result inconsistent with the legislative intention of
the tax preference provision and Esmark possessed the ability to achieve
the result.
Internal Revenue Code Section 31 1(d)(1),(2)(B)(1969) governed the
1980 transactions in Esmark and permitted a corporation to distribute
certain appreciated stock of a subsidiary in redemption of the distribut-
ing corporation's stock without recognition of gain. The statute was one
of the few exceptions to a provision enacted in 1969 which substantially
reversed the General Utilities doctrine, which had permitted a corpora-
tion to distribute appreciated property without gain recognition.227
Shortly after the Esmark transaction occurred, the 1969 provision was
amended for transactions after 1982 to allow nonrecognition of gain only
for distributions in redemption of the stock of noncorporate shareholders
who held the redeemed stock for at least five years before the
distribution.2 -8
The Senate Finance Committee proposed the 1969 rules because it
believed that a corporate distribution of appreciated property was the
economic equivalent of a sale:
Recently, large corporations have redeemed very substantial amounts
of their own stock with appreciated property for a corporate purpose
to much the same effect as if the property had been sold and the stock
had been redeemed with the proceeds of the sale. The appreciation is
not taxed, however, on this type of disposition. The committee does
not believe that a corporation should be permitted to avoid tax on any
appreciated property (investments, inventory, or business property) by
disposing of the property in this manner.
229
227. The statutory provisions involved in Esmark were .C. § 311(aX2XI954), the 1954
codification of the General Utilities rule, and I.R.C. § 31 l(dXl),(2)(BX1969), one of the excep-
tions to the rule enacted in the 1969 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L No. 91-172, § 905, 84 Stat. 487
(1969). Other pre-1969 exceptions to the General Utilities doctrine required recognition of
gain on the distribution of appreciated LIFO inventory, property subject to a liability that
exceeded the distributor's adjusted basis in the property, installment obligations, "recapture"
and investment credit property. BrrrKER & EUSTICE I, supra note 74, 1 7.21, at 7-53-7-59.
In addition, judge-made exceptions existed. Id,
228. I.R.C. § 311(e)(1982). See Axelrod, Esmark's Tax-Free Disposition, supra note 74, at
251-52. For most other distributions, the General Utilities rule of nonrecognition of gain on
the distribution of appreciated property was completely repealed for post-1986 years by the
1986 Tax Reform Act. BI-rKIR & EUSTICE II, supra note 74, 7.21, at 7-49. The complete
repeal (subject to certain transitional rules) of the General Utilities doctrine several years after
the Esmark transaction did not influence the Esmark court's decision. Esmark Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 90 T.C. 171, 183 (1988).
229. S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 279 (1969).
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In conference, the concept of gain recognition was accepted with some
exceptions, including the one relied upon in the Esmark transaction.230
The legislative history does not indicate when Congress intended an
exception to the recognition of gain to be allowed. 231 Because of the pau-
city of legislative history on when the exception exists, it is uncertain
whether Congress intended the nonrecognition of gain under section
311(d)(2)(B) to apply to the redemption of Mobil's Esmark stock. De-
spite the silence of the 1969 legislative history, the Service argued that
section 311(d)(2)(B) could not permit nonrecognition of gain in this in-
stance because Mobil did not receive the distribution in redemption of
Esmark stock in its capacity as an Esmark shareholder.232 To support
this argument, the Service cited the legislative history of the 1954 codifi-
cation of the General Utilities rule in section 311(a),233 which stated that
"distributions... made to persons other than shareholders, or... made
to shareholders in a capacity other than that of a shareholder" did not
qualify for nonrecognition of gain.2 34
Congress founded the General Utilities rule upon a distinction based
on form. A corporation's sale of appreciated property to a third party
generated gain that must be recognized, while a corporation's distribu-
tion of that property to its shareholder in redemption of its own stock
generated no recognizable gain. Even though both the sale and the re-
demption amounted in substance to a disposition of corporate property, a
redemption received more favorable tax treatment.
While the statute permitted distinctions based solely upon the form
of a transaction, the legislature nonetheless required every transaction
entitled to the statutory preference to be what it purported to be. Conse-
quently, the statute required recognition of gain on a distribution pur-
portedly in redemption of stock if, for example, the distribution was not
to an entity acting in its capacity as shareholder. A thctual question ex-
230. The conference report gave no reasons for the exceptions. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 782,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 333 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Conf. Rep.]. See als9 BrrTKER & EUSTICE I,
supra note 74, % 9.64, at 9-78. No hearings were held on the Senate proposal. Id. There was
no House Ways and Means Committee proposal. 1969 Conf. Rep., at 333. There were many
attempts by taxpayers to exploit section 31 1(d)(2)(B). See BITTKER & EUSTICE 1, supra note
74, % 9.64, at S9-42 (Supp. 1987 No. 1).
231. 1969 Conf. Rep., supra note 230, at 333. Congress requested a determination whether
the 1969 changes "constituted hardships in any areas." Id.
232. The Service made this argument in Rev. Rul. 83-38, 1983-1 C.B. 76 as well as in
Esmark.
233. Esmark Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171, 184 (1988) afld 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Or.
1989)(citing H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A90 (1954) and S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954)).
234. Id. at 184.
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isted as to whether a distribution was made to Mobil in its capacity as a
shareholder in Esmark or in its capacity as a purchaser of the distributed
stock.
In Esmark, Mobil should not be treated as a true shareholder be-
cause it did not hold the stock for a sufficiently long time. Since Mobil
did not qualify as a true shareholder, Congress did not intend the trans-
action to qualify for nonrecognition of gain.
The statute and the legislative history do not contain an express con-
gressional statement that a distribution like the one involved in Esmark
must result in gain recognition. However, the legislature did not intend
for distribution to a momentary shareholder, like Mobil, to qualify for
nonrecognition of gain. If the Tax Court had examined fully the ques-
tion of legislative intention, it should have concluded that the Esmark
redemption was not intended to enjoy the benefits of section
311 (d)(2)(B).
In addition to demonstrating that the transaction achieves a result
inconsistent with the legislative intent, the proposed theory requires that
the result attained be within the taxpayer's control. Esmark possessed
such control over the tender offer and over the redemption that resulted
in the transfer of the subsidiary stock to Mobil.
Four aspects of the transaction demonstrate Esmark's control.
First, Esmark arranged the bidding for the purchase of the stock of the
subsidiary, specifying a preference for a bid proposing a tender offer/
redemption format. Second, Esmark specified that Mobil purchase a
stated number of Esmark shares with a fair market value equal to the
value of the subsidiary's stock sought by Mobil and agreed to redeem
that number of Mobil's Esmark shares in exchange for the subsidiary's
stock. Third, under its agreement with Mobil, Esmark orchestrated the
sequence of events.
Fourth, the sequence of events planned by Esmark demonstrated
control. Esmark did not only want to redeem its stock by using the
tender offer/redemption format. Esmark also wanted to assure that the
subsidiary's stock would be transferred into the hands of Mobil. If the
disposition of the subsidiary's stock to Mobil had not been the primary
motivation, Esmark would have avoided entering into an exchange
agreement with Mobil. Instead, it would have distributed the stock of
the subsidiary to its shareholders in redemption of their Esmark stock,
leaving it to the shareholders to make arrangements to sell the subsidiary
stock." 5 Esmark did not take this simpler route because it wished to
235. On the distribution, Esmark would recognize no gain. I.R.C. § 311(a),(bX2)(B)
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retain control over the-disposition of the subsidiary's stock.
The Tax Court's opinion implies that sufficient control to justify
recharacterization did not exist because Esmark could not require the
shareholders to sell their stock to Mobil.236 Moreover, it found insignifi-
cant the control inherent in the overall plan for Mobil to acquire the
subsidiary stock and for Esmark to redeem its own stock. The court
found the plan's existence inconsequential because each step taken had
an "independent function" and "permanent economic consequences.
'237
The court did not properly evaluate the control exerted by Esmark
insofar as it focused on the existence of a business purpose for each step
of the transaction. The fact that steps taken have permanent economic
consequences should not immunize a transaction that achieves a result
inconsistent with the meaning of a statutory provision. The essence of a
linear transaction is that it achieves a financial or economic result. If the
mere presence of business objectives prevents application of the step
transaction doctrine or a substance over form approach, then no business
deal could be recharacterized by reference to its substance and not form.
In the Esmark transaction, the absence of a "mere device" or meaning-
less step should not serve to sanction tax avoidance that is not authorized
by statute.
The court also found it compelling that Esmark could only accom-
plish its business objectives in two steps. It declined to apply the step
transaction doctrine because recharacterization would not "simply com-
bine steps [but invent] new ones." '238 The objection to the invention of
new steps is misplaced since application of the step transaction doctrine
always requires creation of a fiction. Because it was reluctant to ignore
any step with real financial consequence, the court failed to employ a
substance over form approach.
A more accurate view of the Esmark transaction is that, pursuant to
a pre-arranged plan, Mobil purchased Esmark stock from Esmark share-
holders and then in a redemption exchanged the Esmark stock for stock
of an Esmark subsidiary. For purposes of determining whether Esmark
recognized gain on the exchange of the subsidiary stock for its own stock,
Mobil is not treated as a shareholder that redeemed its Esmark stock.239
(1980). The shareholders would be treated as recipients of a § 301 distribution (a dividend to
the extent of earnings and profits) or sales proceeds, depending on the reduction in sharehold-
ings. I.R.C. § 302 (1980).
236. Esmark, 90 T.C. at 188.
237. Id at 198.
238. Id. at 196.
239. The refusal to treat Mobil as an Esmark shareholder is justified because Mobil only
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Consequently, Esmark recognized gain on the taxable exchange of the
subsidiary stock for its own stock. No new steps are created and all
other steps are respected.240
B. White
In cases in which a court cannot determine statutory purpose and a
taxpayer has used a tax statute to obtain a tax preference, the proposed
model urges the adoption of an approach that attempts to balance the
interests of the taxpayer and the taxing authority. The impetus for the
balancing approach is the belief that a court, rather than a taxpayer,
should determine the consequences of a tax statute.24  Application of the
proposed model to White necessitates application of the balancing test.
Use of the balancing test is appropriate in White because U.K. courts
generally do not refer to legislative intention concerning the statutes at
issue.242
Factors present in White demonstrate the propriety of applying the
momentarily held the stock, the tax planners sought to accomplish a result not sanctioned by
the statute, and the end was within control of the planners.
240. This conclusion is supported by a view that the step transaction doctrine involves not
only the disregard of steps but also the amalgamation of steps taken by the taxpayer. As
Professor Bittker noted:
Although step transaction doctrine cases often, perhaps even usually, are concerned
with whether a particular step with significant legal or business consequences should
be treated as part of a larger single transaction, there are also many cases in which
particular steps in an integrated transaction are disregarded as transitory events or
empty formalities.
Boris I. Bittker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the Construction of the Internal Revenue Code,
21 How. LJ. 693, 720-21 (1978).
241. Some may reject the balancing approach on the ground that it encourages so-called
"judicial activism." While she rejects legislative activity by the judiciary, this writer supports
judicial involvement in the interpretation of tax statutes. Considering legislative amendment
of the statutes in question in response to the transactions effected in Esmark and White, it
seems entirely appropriate that, after consideration of the appropriate factors, a court should
determine whether the taxpayer may be permitted to rely upon a tax preference provision.
Absent a balancing approach, tax laws would exist only by the sufferance of every clever tax-
payer in the interim between implementation of tax avoidance and legislative reaction. See,
e.g., Craven v. White [1988] 3 All E.R. 495, 508 (I.L.) (Lord Templeman) ("[Tihere is a
distinction between an independent transaction carried out to avoid the ambit of a taxing stat-
ute in a manner authorised by Parliament and a transaction which is not an independent trans-
action but forms part of an artificial tax avoidance scheme designed to enable the taxpayer to
carry out a taxable transaction and to avoid an assessment to tax. Parliament cannot have
intended that an individual taxpayer should be able to elect to carry out a taxable transaction
and to avoid an assessment to tax.").
242. "English law.., excludes reference to Parliamentary debates in determining the
meaning of a [tax] statute." Ward et al., The Business Purpose Test and Abuse of Rights, 1985
BiT. TAx RFV. 68, 122 n. 44. See also Michael Rawlinson, Tax Legislation and the Hansard
Rule, 1983 BmRT. TAX REv. 274. Of the statutes involved, the 1965 Finance Act was updated
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balancing test. The Queensferry transaction in While involved deferral
of taxation, taxpayer control over steps taken, lack of business exigency
regarding steps taken, and taxpayer intention to avoid taxation.243 In
that transaction, the taxpayers transferred shares of a family-owned cor-
poration to a wholly-owned Isle of Man company in contemplation of a
merger. Because of concurrent negotiations for an outright sale of the
shares of the family-owned business, the possibility arose that the merger
would not take place and that the shares would be sold to another party.
Taxpayers deferred capital gains tax by having the Isle of Man company
sell the shares. No tax resulted on the transfer of the shares to the Isle of
Man company and there was no attribution of the company's sale of the
transferred shares to the taxpayers. Moreover, the taxpayers were not
taxed on the receipt of most of the proceeds of the sale as loans from the
Isle of Man company.
In addition, the taxpayers possessed control over each step. The
taxpayers transferred the shares of the family company when the ar-
rangements and negotiations for either a merger or a cash purchase were
ongoing. Shortly after the transfer, the taxpayers caused their wholly-
owned Isle of Man company to sell the shares. The sequence of events
demonstrated that the taxpayers possessed the ability to achieve the tax
minimizing steps. Consequently, there was sufficient control to support
application of a substance over form approach.2"
Finally, no business exigency required the taxpayers to transfer the
family corporation shares to the intermediary in order to effect the even-
tual sale. Thus, in balancing interests, the need of a taxpayer to achieve
business goals is not present and need not be accommodated because the
shares could have been disposed of without the intermediate step.
Tax avoidance motives are the final consideration in the balancing
test. While the mere existence of taxpayer intention to avoid tax should
not alone support the application of a substance over :orm approach, it is
and the 1976 Land Development Tax was in relevant part repealed after the transactions in
question occurred. See 42 HALSBURY'S STATUTES, supra note 91, at 8, 16.
243. Craven v. White, [1988] 3 All E.R. 495, 512 (H.L.).
244. The majority of the House of Lords in White refused to attribute the actions of the
intermediary to the taxpayers in order to find a disposition of the shares by the taxpayers. The
House of Lords came to this conclusion because it was not almost absolutely certain at the
time of the transfer to the intermediary that the sale would take place. Id. at 530. In the,
majority's view, without such a degree of certainty, the taxpayers lacked control justifying
recharacterization. Id. at 527-28. This Article rejects the approach taken by the majority of
the House of Lords in White and advocates a broad view of control and not the narrower view
adopted by the White majority. When balancing the interests of the taxing authority and the
taxpayer and where a taxpayer arrangement accomplishes a deferral of taxation, it is appropri.
ate to consider all evidence of taxpayer control over the result achieved.
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an appropriate factor to be considered in determining the interests of the
parties.245 The manifestation of that intention by the arrangement of a
lock-step sequence of events in the Queensferry transaction in Vite and
the other factors discussed above indicates that the balance weighs in
favor of the taxing authority and the application of substance over form.
The Queensferry transaction can be seen as negotiation toward a
sale or merger after which the taxpayers transferred shares to a wholly-
owned company so that it could either engage in a merger or sell the
shares tax-free. The taxpayers controlled the disposition in either case.
The sale was made by the wholly-owned company in form. In reality,
the sale was made by the taxpayers and, therefore, the taxpayers were
liable for capital gains tax on gain realized as a result of the sale.
A different result would obtain in the "Bowater" and "Gregory"
transactions which are the two other transactions involved in White. In
those transactions, plans to effect a disposition were abandoned after the
transfer of property to the intermediary. As a consequence, taxpayer
control over the accomplishment of steps necessary for avoidance of tax-
ation, a significant factor in the balancing approach, did not exist.2 46 The
only factors present in those transactions that would support application
of a substance over form approach were escape from taxation and, possi-
bly, tax avoidance intention. As the latter factor is a weak indicator,
there is insufficient evidence to justify recharacterization. The opposite
result would require a tax conclusion that would not adequately protect
taxpayer expectations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The issues in Esmark and White involve questions of statutory inter-
pretation. They exist because legislators failed to indicate whether the
transactions at issue fell within the purview of the statute. The failure
resulted from intentional failure to clarify the statute, lack of foresight,
or desire not to unduly restrict business transactions. Whatever the
cause, the problem of imprecision in tax statutes will not be resolved by a
call for more attentive legislating. A tax world in which all statutes are
so comprehensive that courts are left without the ability to apply them to
new or unforeseen business deals would be objectionable.247
245. Taxpayer intention may also clarify the matter of the taxpayer's control over the ar-
rangement. See text accompanying notes 220-23.
246. White, 3 All E.R. at 512-13. Under the proposal, control is established by both intrin-
sic and extrinsic indicia.
247. Some jurisidictions have chosen to resolve tax avoidance questions by statutory enact-
ment. See Paul Trotter, Canada's GeneralAnti-avoidance Rule, 5 INTERTAX 180 (1989). Cer-
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Instead of additional legislation to resolve the imprecision of tax
statutes, this Article advocates application of a substance over form ap-
proach to tax cases. Under the proposed theory, a court should apply a
substance over form approach whenever a transaction achieves a result
that is inconsistent with interpretation of a statute and where the result
was controlled by the taxpayer. This approach safeguards the ability of a
taxpayer to plan business transactions and the interest of the government
in preventing manipulation of tax statutes. When a court is unable to
discern legislative intention, it should protect the interests of the parties
by examining factors such as tax reduction, business exigency, taxpayer
control, and tax avoidance intention that relate to the propriety of
recharacterizing business transactions.
tain U.K. commentators have urged a similar approach. See I.R.C. § 269 for an example of
the statutory approach under U.S. tax laws. See Millett, ArtificialAvoidance, supra note 20, at
338. This writer subscribes to the view taken by Justice Millett who stated: "The great advan-
tage of judge-made law is that it is based on principle, and unlike statute law cannot be under-
mined by microscopic examination in the search for loopholes." Id. See also Alan Gunn, Tax
Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REv. 733, 767 (1978). While consideration of the potential advan-
tages of a statutory approach is of interest, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
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